Cunningham v. Los Angeles Railway Co.
Before: Fleet
Synopsis
Negligence—Injury to Infant by Electric Railway Car—Instruction—Inexperience of Motorman—Error—Question of Ordinary Care.—In an action against an electric railway company to recover damages for injuries received by an infant plaintiff from being knocked down and run over by one of the cars of the company, by reason of its alleged negligence, where there was no direct issue upon the employment of an incompetent servant, an instruction to the jury that, in determining whether the defendant was negligent in not stopping its car so as to avoid the injury, they had the right to take into consideration the fact, in evidence, that the motorman “ had only been at work about twelve days,” and “was a new hand on the road,” is erroneous, the defendant not being responsible for slight negligence, but only for a want of ordinary care, and the question whether it was in the exercise of such care must be determined from a consideration of what actually occurred at the time of the alleged negligent act, regardless of any fact affecting the general character of the servant for skill or proficiency in the discharge of his duty, which fact should not have been submitted to the jury.
Id.—Duty of Company to Provide for Safety—Deficient Instruction—Omission of Qualification—Ordinary Care.—An instruction to the jury, in such action, that it was the duty of a person or company operating an electric railway upon the streets of a city to provide “proper cars and appliances, and to provide safe, skillful; watchful, and competent agents or servants to manage the same” is deficient in not further charging that, in performing such duty, the defendant, so far as its obligation to the plaintiff was concerned, was only called upon to exercise ordinary care, and an instruction given on behalf of the defendant as to the degree of care required of its servants, is not the equivalent of such qualification.
Id.—Action of Infant Plaintiff—Improper Instruction—Duty of Parents to Keep Attendant with Young Child—Question for Jury.—In an action for negligence brought by an infant plaintiff, aged eighteen months, an instruction to the jury that the law does not require parents to keep an attendant with their young children, and that they are not required to shut them up, is improper, the question whether such precautions are necessary, under any given circumstances, to constitute ordinary care for the safety of their children, with which parents are charged, being one of fact for the jury, and not for the court to determine as matter of law.
Id.—Contributory Negligence of Parents—Avoidance of Injury— Question for Jury.—Assuming the contributory negligence of the parents of a young child run over by an electric railway car, nevertheless the question whether, notwithstanding such negligence, the defendant could have avoided the injury, when fairly involved in the evidence, is a proper one for the jury.
Van Fleet, J. Plaintiff, an infant of eighteen months, escaped from the premises of its parents into the public street, and went upon the track of defendant’s electric railway, running thereon, and was knocked down and injured by one of its cars. He brought this action to recover damages for the injury, alleging negligence by defendant in running over him. From a judgment in his favor, and an order denying defendant’s motion for a new trial, the latter appeals.
The jury were instructed that, in determining whether the defendant was negligent in not stopping its car so [564]as to avoid the injury, they had the right to take into consideration the fact that the motorman “ had only been at work about twelve days, according to his own testimony, and was a new hand on the road.”
There was no direct issue upon the question whether the defendant had been guilty of employing incompetent servants; the question being whether the plaintiff was injured through the actual negligence of defendant’s servants on the occasion dn question; but the fact adverted to in the instruction had incidentally appeared in the cross-examination of the motorman, when examined as a witness for defendant.
It is objected that the instruction was erroneous, as submitting to the jury an element which could have no competent bearing upon the question whether defendant was guilty of the degree of negligerice with which it was chargeable under the circumstances of the case; and this objection must, we think, be sustained.
Defendant was responsible to plaintiff for a want of ordinary care only, and whether it was in the exercise of such care was to be determined from a consideration of what actually occurred at the time of the alleged negligent act, regardless of any fact affecting the general character of the servant for skill or proficiency in the discharge of his duty. The question was, Did the servant exercise ordinary care to avoid the injury? If he did, the plaintiff could not recover, no matter how wanting the servant may have been in general competency; while if he did not exercise such care, plaintiff was entitled to recover, even if the servant possessed the utmost degree of efficiency and skill in the perform- ■ anee of his duty. The sole question, therefore, was, What was the conduct of the servant at the time? and this was to be unembarrassed by any consideration of his general qualifications. The latter consideration is proper where the defendant is required to exercise the highest or utmost degree of care, and is held responsi- - ble for slight negligence. (Boyce v. California Stage Co., 25 Cal. 468; Ficken v. Jones, 28 Cal. 618.) In such a
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