People v. Worthington

California Supreme Court Dec 8, 1896 No. Crim. No. 184Published

Before: Garoutte

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Holding. The court held that a trial judge's instruction assuming a fact does not require reversal if that fact is conceded or undisputed by the evidence. Because the defendant did not raise or present evidence of self-defense, the judge's instruction removing that issue from the jury was not prejudicial error.

Issues

Whether a trial court's instruction assuming a fact constitutes reversible error when that fact is undisputed.
Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence regarding the deceased's whereabouts and certain letters.

Disposition. Affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“an instruction assuming a fact does not demand a reversal, if the fact is admitted, or there is no shadow of conflict of evidence with respect to it.”

“In no possible way was defendant’s case prejudiced by the giving of this instruction.”

Synopsis

Criminal Law—Homicide—Insanity—Self-defense not Involved • - Harmless Instruction.—The court should be careful not to charge the jury in relation to any matter of fact, but where the whole theory and claim of the defense upon a charge 'of murder was the insanity of the defendant at the time of the homicide, and the record discloses without contradiction, and as matter of law, that the question of self-defense was not in the case, the homicide by the defendant having been clearly proven, and there having been no attempt by the defendant to introduce evidence of self-defense, or tending to show that the crime committed amounted only to manslaughter, or that the defendant was justifiable or excusable under the burden devolved upon him by section 1105 of the Penal Code, an instruction telling the jury in effect, that the question of self-defense was not in the case under the evidence, could not be prejudicial to the defendant, and is not ground for new trial.

Id.—Harmless Rulings upon Evidence.—Rulings for the admission of immaterial evidence, or evidence the objection to which.pointed toward its weight, and of evidence as to the receipt of unidentified papers and letters, not connected in some way with the case, are harmless, and not ground of reversal.

Id.—Identified Letters of Defendant.—Identified letters from the defendant to the deceased, found upon his body, or handed to a witness by the deceased immediately after he was wounded, are admissible in evidence for the prosecution.

Garoutte, J. The appellant was convicted of murder in the second degree, and now appeals from the judgment and order denying her motion for a new trial.

It is insisted that the trial court committed error in giving the jury the following instruction: - “It is, however, supposed to be unnecessary to elaborate the law of self-defense for the purpose of this case, inasmuch as it is understood to be conceded that the deceased was not, at the moment he was shot, endeavoring to do any injury to the accused woman, or to any other person, but was standing quietly at the wharf when she took his life by shooting him with a loaded pistol.” It is unfortunate that the statements of the judge found in this instruction as to the facts of the case should have gone to the jury. It is said in People v. Gordon, 88 Cal. 426: “That [245]judges must not charge juries with respect to matters of fact is a constitutional prohibition which has been jealously guarded and rigidly upheld- from the earliest judicial history of the state.” In People v. Phillips, 70 Cal. 68, the trial court detailed to the jury certain facts of the case as having been proven, and this court there said: “Of course this mode of charging a jury should be carefully avoided, but it has been held here that an instruction assuming a fact does not demand a reversal, if the fact is admitted, or there is no shadow of conflict of evidence with respect to it.”

In the present case, if there was any bona fide claim that the killing was done in self-defense, this instruction of the judge would demand a new trial of the case; but we examine the record in vain for any such claim b)r counsel, and look in vain in that record for a word of evidence tending to show that the killing was done in self-defense. The statement of defendant’s counsel to the jury in outlining the facts which were to constitute his client’s defense did not even hint at self-defense. The defendant herself testified: “I have no recollection of having fired a shot at him.” Defendant’s counsel rested the case upon the theory that, if the defendant killed the deceased, she was insane at the time, and not legally responsible for the act. That she did kill the deceased must be taken as a conceded fact, and upon such concession appellant is then left to justify upon the sole plea of nonaccountability. Of course, evidence at the trial offered by a defendant may take a wider range than his opening statement, and may establish defenses not there adverted to. Yet here such is not the fact. The most injurious construction to defendant which could be given the charge is that in effect the jury were told by it that the question of self-defense was not in the case. The record discloses that fact without contradiction and as matter of law; and there is nothing in the giving of this instruction to demand a new trial. There are many trials upon charges of murder where self-defense is not an element, and no harm could pos

People v. Worthington

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