McDonald v. Hinton
Before: Garoutte
Synopsis
Application in the Supreme Court for a writ of mandate to the Registrar of Voters of the City and County of San Francisco.
Petitioner, as a duly qualified elector of the city and county of San Francisco, and a candidate for office, nominated by a convention which he alleges represented the Democratic party of said city and county, asked, on behalf of himself, and of all persons similarly situated, of said Democratic party, and of all nominees of said party and convention, for a writ of mandate to compel William M. Hinton, as registrar of voters of the city and county of San Francisco, to forthwith file the certificate of nomination of said convention, and to cause to be printed upon the ballots to be by him prepared for and used by the electors and voters at the election to be held on Novenber 3d, 1896, the names of the petitioner and all other nominees of said convention, and the office for which they were respectively nominated, and to place after each of said nominees the designation “ Democrat.” Petitioner avers that said convention was duly called by the general committee of the Democratic party of the city and county of San Francisco,, which governs said party under a certain plan of organization; that the nominees of the convention called by said general committee in 1892 were recognized as the nominees of said Democratic party in the official ballot voted at the general election in that year, and in 1894 the names of the candidates nominated by the convention called by said general committee were placed upon the official municipal ticket, and after the name of each candidate was placed the designation “ Democrat,” and said designation was not placed after the name of any other candidate upon said official ballot; that the election in 1894 was the last one prior to the filing of this petition, held in said city and county, and that each and every one of said nominees polled at least three per cent of the entire vote of the district for which they were presented; that the secretary of the convention called by said general committee in 1896, duly prepared a certificate of nomination complying with the provisions of the law, which was, within the time required by law, presented to respondent with the demand that it be filed in his office as required by law, and that he cause the names of the nominees mentioned in said certificate, and the office for which they were nominated, to be printed on the official ballots to ' be used by the electors at the election to be held in said ' city and county on the third day of November, 1896, and after the name of each of them he placed the designation “Democrat”; that respondent refused to file the same, for the alleged reason that said document did not emanate from a “ convention representing a political party which, at the last election before the holding of such convention, polled at least three per cent of the entire vote of the county, city, or other political division for which the nomination is made,” as required by the Political Code, section 1186. The answer of the registrar denied the right and authority of the convention which nominated the petitioner, to represent the “ Democratic party,” and averred that the state central committee of the Democratic party of the state of California, had found, adjudged, and determined that the authority under which said convention was called was not, and never had been, the organization of the Democratic party within the city and county of San Francisco, which determination was approved by the last state convention of the Democratic party; and further averred that the regular municipal convention of the Democratic party of San Francisco was then in session; and that the effect of granting the prayer of the petitioner would be to deceive and confuse the voters, and amount to a fraud upon the public.
Opinion
The Court. The writ should be denied. Whether a registrar, in filing or refusing to file a proffered certificate of nomination by a convention, acts ministerially or judicially, it is clear that he cannot be commanded by mandamus to do an act which the law does not require him to do. Now, sections 1186 and 1187 of the Political Code clearly contemplate that a political party which, at the last election, polled at least three per cent of the entire vote, can be represented by only one convention. A contrary view would certainly defeat the purpose of the law. Therefore, when each of two or more bodies of voters claims to be the convention contemplated by the code, the registrar must determine—in the first instance, at least—which one of the bodies was “ an organized assemblage of delegates representing ” the particular political party named. To say that the presentation of a certificate in due form is conclusive of the essential fact upon which the alleged right rests [487]is to announce the principle that each party to a controversy is the exclusive judge of his own case. If the issue were presented here, whether or not the convention which the petitioners represent was the convention which in fact represented the Democratic party, then this court would have to consider whether or not it would, upon mandamus, hear evidence, and, after a trial here, itself determine the essential fact in dispute. But this proceeding was submitted upon the admission that the convention represented by petitioners only “claimed to be,” but was not, a convention representing said political party, and upon the theory that the registrar was bound to file their certificate merely because it was in due and regular form. Therefore, the question whether or not this court should, upon mandamus, inquire into the fact, and determine whether said convention did or did not represent said political party, is not before us. It therefore does not appear that the registrar has refused to do any act which the law enjoins upon him as a duty.
The petition for the writ of mandamus is denied, and the proceeding dismissed.
McFarland, J., Henshaw, J., Van Fleet, J., and Temple, J., concurred.
Harrison, J., and Beatty, C. J., dissented.
Dissent — Garoutte
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