People v. Roemer
Before: Henshaw
Synopsis
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County and from an order denying a new trial. B. N. Smith, Judge.
The instruction referred to in the fourth subdivision of the opinion of the court was as follows: “In order to justify the homicide, the danger menacing the defendant must have been present, apparent, and imminent, and the killing must have been done under a well-founded belief that it was absolutely necessary for the defendant to kill the deceased at that time to save himself from great bodily harm. The apprehension of danger to life or limb which justifies a man for taking the life of another must be an honest one—one that is well grounded, and must arise out of a reasonable cause; but a cause which originates in the fault of the person himself—in a quarrel which he has provoked, or in a danger which he has voluntarily brought upon himself, by his own misconduct, cannot be considered reasonable or sufficient, in law, to support a well-grounded apprehension of imminent danger to his person. Error of apprehension the law overlooks, when a man is called upon to act on appearances, but it does not overlook dishonesty of apprehension. Hence, a real or apparent necessity, brought about by the design, contrivance, or fault of the defendant, cannot be availed of as a defense for the commission of a crime. And no man, by his own lawless acts, can create a necessity for acting in self-defense, and thereupon, killing the person with whom he seeks the difficulty, interpose the plea of self-defense. The plea of necessity is a shield for those only who are without fault in occasioning it and acting under it. Undoubtedly, the defendant can show, in justification, that, although he brought upon himself an imminent danger, he, in the presence of that necessity, changed his mind and conduct, and honestly endeavored to escape from it, but could not without striking the mortal-blow. But, in the absence of such circumstances, when the defendant seeks and brings upon himself a difficulty with the deceased, in which he willingly continues until he involves himself in the necessity to kill, the law will not hold him guiltless. The right of self-defense which justifies a homicide does not include the right of attack.”
Further facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Henshaw, J. The defendant, charged with murder and convicted of murder in the second degree, presents these appeals from the judgment and from the order denying him a new trial.
The killing was admitted, and the plea was self-defense.
1. It is first claimed that the verdict is against the evidence. But without detailing the accounts of the different witnesses, which could serve no useful purpose, a critical examination of the record shows that the evidence is ample to sustain the verdict. The testimony for the defense raises, as is not unusual, a sharp conflict, [55]but, in such cases, under the well-settled rule the jury ig the final arbiter of the facts, and its determination cannot here be disturbed.
2. Defendant, upon direct examination, was asked by his counsel if he had ever been charged with killing anybody, and answered that he had not. Upon cross-examination he was asked, after the proper foundation had been laid, whether he had not stated that he had been accused of the murder of a man, but that they could not prove it against him. The question was not permissible, generally, upon cross-examination. But in this case the defendant had opened the door and invited the inquiry by his own testimony, and it became permissible to refute that testimony by direct evidence tc> the contrary, or to impeach it by showing contrary declarations made by him. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 2052.)
3. Defendant proposed, the following instruction, which was refused by the judge as having been given before: “If you believe that the defendant at the time of the killing had a reasonable apprehension and belief that deceased was about to execute his threat to kill him, and that it was necessary for the protection of his own life that he should kill deceased, though defendant had resolved to kill deceased before the fatal shot was fired, the killing was not murder, and your verdict should be not guilty.”
The law of self-defense had been adequately set forth. Aside from other objections to the proposed instruction, it is erroneous in declaring as a fact that deceased had threatened to kill defendant.
4. The court gave an instruction identical in language with that considered in People v. Kennett, ante, p. 18. This was not error.
The judgment and order are affirmed.
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