Quinchard v. Board of Trustees

California Supreme Court Aug 7, 1896 No. S. F. No. 80Published

Before: Harrison

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Holding. The court held that a writ of certiorari (writ of review) is improper to challenge municipal street improvement proceedings because such actions are legislative or ministerial in nature, rather than judicial, and the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law.

Issues

Whether a writ of review may be used to challenge municipal street improvement proceedings.
Whether the acts of a board of trustees and a superintendent of streets in ordering and executing street improvements constitute judicial functions subject to review by certiorari.

Disposition. reversed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“The functions exercised by a municipal corporation may be legislative, administrative, or judicial, but only the acts done by it “when exercising judicial functions ” can be reviewed under this procedure.”

“The judgment is reversed, and the superior court is directed to dismiss the writ.”

Synopsis

Certiorari—■Office of Writ—Cloud upon Title—Legislative Action— Order for Street Improvement—Discretion.—The writ of certiorari can only be allowed in this state to review the exercise of judicial functions when the jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal, board, or officer is exceeded, and cannot he used as a substitute for an action to remove a cloud from a title, nor to review legislative acts, such as an order for a street improvemeut, which does not cease to he legislative in its character merely because the members of the city council are required to exercise their judgment and discretion in determining whether the improvement shall be made.

Id.—Misjoinder of Parties.—In a proceeding to review the action of a municipal council, in reference to a street improvement, it is improper to join the superintendent of streets and the street contractor as parties defendant.

Harrison, J. The plaintiff obtained a writ of review from the superior court for the purpose,of annulling an order passed by the board of trustees of Alameda for the improvement of a certain street in that city, and all subsequent proceedings in reference thereto. Upon the return to the writ, and after a hearing thereon, the court rendered its judgment annulling the order for the improvement, “ and that all acts or proceedings taken or had, done or performed, by the said board of trustees, and by the said superintendent of streets, respondents, subsequent to the said twenty-third day of March, 1891, appearing in and by the returns herein, be and the same are hereby annulled and held for naught.” From this judgment -the respondents to the writ have appealed.

The plaintiff does not contend that the resolution of intention to order the improvement is insufficient, or that it was not properly passed by the board of trustees, or that the notices and other proceedings required by the street improvement act in order to give to the board of trustees jurisdiction to order the improvement were not properly given; but it is claimed that the proceedings subsequent thereto were of such a character as to vitiate the order, as well as the contract for doing the work and the assessment issued therefor. Counsel have discussed very fully the sufficiency of these subsequent proceedings, but from the conclusion we have reached upon the proposition of the appellants that the writ was improperly issued, it is unnecessary to pass upon the sufficiency of these proceedings.

At common law the writ of certiorari was employed for the purpose of reviewing the proceedings of inferior [668]tribunals in their exercise of judicial powers, and was issued in cases where the final determinations of those tribunals were not subject to review in any other mode. The writ was considered an extraordinary legal remedy, and was issued in the discretion of the court, and only when there was no other mode of review. This discretion, however, was not arbitrary, but was only a legal discretion controlled by principles of law, and, if improperly exercised, was subject to be corrected on appeal. (Supervisors v. Magoon, 109 Ill. 142.) As a street assessment in this state can be collected only by means of foreclosure in a court of record, and as the facts relied upon by the plaintiff herein would be available in defense of such action, and if deemed sufficient to establish a want of jurisdiction either for ordering the improvement or awarding the contract, would defeat the action, the discretion of the court would have been properly exercised in denying the writ. (Spooner v. Seattle, 6 Wash. 370; People v. Myers, 135 N. Y. 465.) The writ should never be employed as a substitute for an action to remove a cloud from a title.

Quinchard v. Board of Trustees

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