Haile v. Smith
Before: Harrison
Synopsis
Vendor and Purchaser—Action of Ejectment by Vendor—Pleading —Tender of Deed.—A complaint in ejectment by a vendor against a purchaser need not set out the deed tendered to the defendant, and the averment that he tendered a good and sufficient deed of grant, bargain, and sale to the property shows a compliance with his part of the agreement.
Id.—Time of Tender—Provision Making Time of Essence.—The vendor does not lose his right of action for the recovery of the land by not tendering the deed upon the day when the last payment fell due; and the provision making time of the essence of the agreement does not authorize the vendee, by failing to make the payments agreed upon, to treat the contract as rescinded.
Id.—Defense to Ejectment—Continuing Contract of Sale—Tender by Defendant.—The vendor cannot maintain an action to recover possession of the land held under the contract of sale, so long as the vendee continues to recognize the validity of the agreement, and to perform its terms; and an answer denying the tender of a good and sufficient deed for the land, and alleging that defendant has performed all the covenants of the contract on his part, and that, before the date of the alleged tender of a deed by plaintiff, he had tendered the full amount of the last payment, and demanded a conveyance of the land according to the agreement, which demand was refused by plaintiff, and that he had ever since been able, ready, and willing to make such payment upon receipt of a sufficient deed from plaintiff, states a defense to the action.
Id.— Unaccepted Tender op Purchase Money— Release of Land from Claim—Subsequent Tender of Deed.—An unaccepted tender of purchase money, though not releasing the purchaser from his obligation to pay the money, has the effect to release the land from any further claim thereto by the vendor, and to remit the vendor to his personal claim for the purchase money, and a subsequent tender of a deed, and refusal to pay cannot give to the vendor a right to recover possession of the land.
Id.—Pleading—Date of Tender—Uncertainty.—An answer averring a tender of the purchase money on or about a certain date is sufficient as against a general demurrer, in the absence of a special demurrer for uncertainty; and it is sufficient that the answer shows a tender of the purchase money while the plaintiff was treating the agreement in force, though the tender was made after the date fixed by the contract.
Id.—Averment of Plaintiff’s Title.—The allegation of the complaint that at the date of the agreement plaintiff was the owner of the land in fee simple, and that after the maturity of the agreement he tendered to defendant a good and sufficient deed of the lots, is a sufficient averment of plaintiff’s title.
Id.—Lien for Purchase Money not Involved.—A lien of the purchaser upon the land as security for the payment made by him exists only when he is entitled to recover back the payment in case of failure of consideration, and is not involved in an action of ejectment by the vendor when the purchaser relies upon the agreement as being in force, and as entitling him to remain in possession of the land, which he cannot retain and at the same time recover the amount paid under the contract.
Harrison, J. Ejectment.
The plaintiff alleges that on the 24th of September, 1891, he was the owner in fee of a certain lot of land in Alameda, and that, on that day, he entered into an agreement with the defendant for the conveyance of the land to him upon certain terms therein expressed. By the terms of the agreement, which is set forth at length in the complaint, the defendant agreed to pay for the land three hundred and fifty dollars, one hundred dollars at its execution, one hundred dollars before January 1,1892, and the balance, one hundred and fifty dollars, on or before January 1, 1893. The time for this last payment was subsequently extended for another year. The agreement also contains the following clause: “ Time is the essence of this agreement, and a failure to comply with the terms hereof, or to make the [660]payments for said premises as herein provided, for a period exceeding sixty days from the date when any payment shall become due and payable by the said party of the second part, the said party of the first part shall be released from all obligations in law or equity to convey said property, and said party of the second part shall forfeit all right thereto, together with the improvements at the time thereon, and all payments theretofore made.” Immediately after the execution of the agreement the defendant entered into possession of the property, and has continued to remain in such possession. It is also alleged in the complaint that the defendant has not made the last payment required by the agreement, and that, on or about the fifteenth day of March, 1894, the plaintiff tendered to the defendant a good and sufficient deed of grant, bargain, and sale to the property above described, and demanded said payment, which the defendant refused, and still refuses, to pay, and that the same has not been paid, and that thereafter, April 11, 1894, he demanded possession of the premises, but the defendant unlawfully withholds the same, to his damage in the sum of seventy-five dollars. Plaintiff thereupon asks judgment for the restitution of the land. To this complaint the defendant filed a general demurrer, which was overruled, and thereafter he filed an answer admitting the execution of the agreement, and alleging that he has faithfully performed all the agreements therein to be performed by him. He also alleges that, on or about the first day of March, and before the alleged tender of a deed by the plaintiff, he tendered to the plaintiff the balance of said purchase money, and demanded a conveyance of said land, which was refused by the plaintiff. The defendant also filed a-cross-complaint, setting forth the agreement with the plaintiff, and substantially the same matters as are alleged in his answer, and that, by reason of the premises, he has an equitable title to the land, which he asks to have protected. The plaintiff demurred to the answer, and also to the cross-complaint,
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