Heidt v. Minor
Before: Fleet
Synopsis
Appeal—Effect of Refusal—New Trial.—Where a judgment is reversed on the ground that it is not supported by the findings, there being no finding at all upon a material fact, the effect of the unqualified reversal is not to entitle the appellant to a judgment upon the findings, but to remand the cause for a new trial.
Id.—Amendment of Pleadings after Reversal—Discretion.—After the reversal of a judgment the parties in the court below have the same rights which they originally had, and the court has discretion to permit any proper amendment to the pleadings.
Id.—Law of the Case.—The law of the case consists not in the reasoning of the court, or the illustrations given upon a former appeal, but in the propositions of law actually decided and applicable to the facts in judgment; and the rule of the law of the case only applies when, upon a subsequent trial, the issues and facts found remain substantially the same, and has no application where the facts alleged and found are materially different from those considered on a former appeal.
Notary Public—False Certificate of Acknowledgment of Mortgage-Liability of Sureties—Measure of Damages—Solvency of Mortgagor.—When a notary public falsely certifies that the mortgagor duly acknowledged the execution of a mortgage, which in fact is a forgery, the measure of damages in an action on the official bond of the notary, brought by one who has parted with value on the faith of the certificate, is the amount which would be the value of the mortgage if genuine, which value is the amount collectible thereon; and if the mortgagor is solvent, the measure of damages is the face value of the mortgage debt, without regard to the value of the mortgaged property, it being immaterial whether the amount of the mortgage debt he collected from the mortgaged property or by the enforcement of a deficiency judgment against the mortgagor.
Van Fleet, J. This is an action against one of the sureties on the official bond of a notary public, to recover damages alleged to havebeen caused by a certain false and fraudulent certificate of acknowledgment. On the first trial a judgment was rendered for plaintiff, which, on appeal to this court, was reversed on the authority of Heidt v. Minor, 89 Cal. 115. That appeal was on the judgment-roll only, and the facts were precisely similar to those in the case cited. On the return of the case to the court below plaintiff, by leave of the court, amended her complaint. The case was then tried before a jury, and plaintiff had a verdict and judgment, and defendant appeals on the judgment-roll only. The points made by appellant are: that the court below should have rendered judgment in favor of defendant on the coming down of the remittitur, and without a new trial; that the court erred in allowing the amendment to the complaint; and that the facts on the second trial were substantially the same as on the first trial, and that, therefore, the rule of “ the law of the case” entitled the defendant to a judgment.
1. The judgment of this court on the first appeal was simply that “ the judgment .... in the above-entitled cause be, and the same is hereby, reversed, with costs.” The effect of this unqualified reversal was to remand the cause for a new trial. (Falkner v. Hendy, 107 Cal. 49, 54.) It may also be remarked that the reversal of a judgment on the ground that it is not supported by the findings does not necessarily imply that any judgment ought to have been rendered on those findings. The reversal in this case was based on the proposition that there was no finding at all upon a certain material fact. In the absence of such finding no judgment could properly have been rendered.
But appellant contends that the original complaint contained no allegation as to the fact in question, that [388]the findings covered all the issues made by the pleadings, and that, therefore, the reversal was really based on the ground that the complaint stated no cause of action. Eo such point was made on that appeal or mentioned in the opinion; and, had it been made, it would have been proper, on remanding the case, to give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend.
2. After the reversal of the judgment the parties in the court below had the same rights which they originally had; and that court, therefore, had discretion to permit any proper amendment to the pleadings. (Phelan v. San Francisco, 9 Cal. 15; Gould v. Stafford, 101 Cal. 32.) The only objection urged to the substance of the amendment is that it did not cure the defect in the original complaint, or make it state a cause of action. This question will most conveniently be considered with the next point.
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