Cooper v. Miller
Before: Garoutte
Synopsis
Taxation—Irrigation District—Validity of Tax Deed—Prima Facie Evidence.—Under section 30 of the irrigation act of 1887, a tax deed executed by the tax-collector of an irrigation district for a delinquent tax levied by its board of directors is prima facie evidence of the validity of the assessment and levy, and of the regularity and official character of the proceedings for the sale, and of the deed, provided only that the deed recites the matter recited in the certificate of sale, and is duly acknowledged or proved.
Id.—Assessment of Improved Lots in One Parcel—Livery Stable.— Where the land sold for taxes consists of five adjoining lots, all belonging to the same owner, upon which a livery stable is situated which extends over and upon each of the lots, the entire five lots are to be considered as but one single parcel of land, for the purposes of taxation, and an assessment of them as such’is valid, and the sale and deed for delinquent taxes regularly based thereon, confers a title.
Id.—Levy for Different Objects.—A levy for different objects may be incorporated in one order of the board of directors of an irrigation districfc; and an order for a levy of a specified sum for a bond fund to pay interest on the bonds of the district may be incorporated with an order for a levy of another specified sum for a general fund to defray the expenses of management, repairs, improvements and the salaries of officers and employees.
Id.—Levy for Special Purposes—Election—Prima Eacie Evidence— Presumption.—Although an election is essential to the validity of the levy of a tax for special purposes in an irrigation district, yet where a tax deed is offered in evidence which proves prima facie the regularity and validity of the levy, if there is no evidence whatever upon the subject of an election, it must be presumed that an election was held according to law to authorize the levy.
Id.—Order for Levy—Absence of Recital of Election.—The order of levy is not required ;to recite the fact of a previous election, nor would a recital thereof bind the owner of the land assessed; and the absence of a recital in the order that an election had been previously held is no evidence that an election was not held authorizing the board to make the levy.
Id.—Evidence—Assessment of Other Property.—In an action involving the validity of the assessment of the particular property, evidence as to the manner and character of the assessment of other property situated within the district is immaterial.
Id.—Ejectment—Tax Deed—Pleading Issue as to Payment—Evidence—Finding of Ownership.—In an action of ejectment upon a” complaint in the ordinary form, where the title of plaintiff depends upon the validity of a tax deed, an answer denying plaintiff’s ownership, and setting up'payment of the tax to defeat plaintiff’s tax title, raises no material issue as to such payment requiring a finding thereon, but payment or nonpayment of the tax is mere matter of evidence admissible undSr the general denial of title; and nonpayment of the tax is sufficiently proved prim a facie by the production of the tax deed; and a finding of ownership of the plaintiff involves a finding of nonpayment of the assessment.
Garoutte, J. This is an action of ejectment to recover possession of certain town lots. Plaintiff’s claim of title is based upon a tax deed, executed by the tax-collector of Central Irrigation District, upon a sale for a delinquent tax levied by the board of directors of said district. Defendants appeal from the judgment and order denying their motion for a new trial, and claim that the assessment, levy, sale, and deed made thereunder are void.
Section 30 of the irrigation act (Stats. 1887, p. 40) provides: “ The matter recited in the certificate of sale must be recited in the deed, and such deed duly acknowledged or proved is prima facie evidence that: 1. The property was assessed as required by law; 2. The property was equalized as required by law; 3. That the assessments were levied in accordance with law; 4. The assessments were not paid; 5. At a proper time and place the property was sold as prescribed by law, and by the proper officer; 6. The property was not redeemed; 7. The person who executed the deed was the proper officer.” •
Invoking these provisions of the statute, plaintiff introduced his deed in evidence as establishing aprima facie case of title in himself, and rested.
It is claimed that the assessment is void because the five town lots were assessed in one parcel with one valuation upon the whole parcel, and one' valuation for the improvements upon the entire parcel. The lots were also sold in one parcel for the nonpayment of the tax. Section 18 of the irrigation act provides that the assessor must assess “ all the property in the district, and must prepare an assessment-book with appropriate headings, in which must be listed and specified in separate columns under the appropriate head: .... 3. City and town lots, naming the city or town, and the number of lot and block, etc., and the improvements thereon.”
Is this assessment void as violative of the foregoing requirements of the law? The provisions of this act as to the manner and character of the assessment are dupli[243]cated from the provisions of the Political Code pertaining to assessments levied for the purposes of state and county taxation, and defendants, to support their contention, rely upon various decisions of this court made in the construction of those provisions of the Political Code. The principal case may be said to be Terrill v. Groves, 18 Cal. 149. There the assessment was held to be void. But that case is widely variant in its facts from the case at bar. There town lots in two distinct and separate blocks, not even contiguous, while valued separately, were carried out upon the roll in a lump assessment, and a single tax charged up against the lots as a whole. In addition to these salient facts, upon one lot there were improvements, and the tax upon these improvements was charged against all the land. In People v. Morse, 43 Cal. 534, it was held that an entire block or a half block owned by a single individual might be assessed in one parcel, and this notwithstanding the blocks were divided into lots, and in sound reason there is no more cause for assessing a block of land owned by one party in lots, than there is in assessing a section of land owned by a single individual in eighty or one hundred and sixty acre tracts. The land involved in this litigation consisted of five lots, with a frontage of twenty-five feet each, adjoining, and all belonging to the defendant Miller. A livery stable was situated upon these lots, and extended over and upon each of them. Upon such a state of facts we are clear that for the purposes of taxation the entire five lots should be held to be but a single parcel of land, and so assessed. With a building resting upon them all, any other kind of assessment would be improper. To divide the improvement into fifthsj and assess an undivided one-fifth thereof upon each lot, would be a practice not contemplated by the law. To hold that the statute requires that the land upon which the Palace Hotel of this city, or any other large building, is situated should be assessed by lots, and the improvements assessed and apportioned in undivided parts to each lot, would be to declare an absurdity existing in
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