Thompson v. Board of Supervisors
Before: Garoutte
Synopsis
Act Regulating Sale of Franchises—Counties—Constitutional Law —Sufficiency of Title.—The act of March 23, 1893, “providing for the sale of railroad franchises in municipalities, and relative to granting of franchises,” and requiring franchises to he “awarded to the highest bidder, ” sufficiently embraces in the latter clause of the title the subject matter of the issuance and salé of franchises by counties through their hoards of supervisors, though such counties are not properly within the designation of municipalities.
Id.—Act not Repealed by County Government Act.—The act of March 23, 1893, providing for the sale of franchises to the highest bidder, was not repealed by subdivision 40 of section 25 of the County Government Act, which went into effect the following day, giving to boards of supervisors the general power to fix the terms, conditions, and restrictions upon which franchises will be granted, since full force and effect may be given to both statutes.
Id.—Repeal by Implication not Favored.—The law looks with disfavor upon repeals by implication, and will not sustain such repeal where there is no such inconsistency as tó call for a determination that the earlier provision was repealed by the later.
Id. — Construction of Statute — Sale to Highest Bidder —Cash Payment — Agreement for Percentage not a Legal Bid.—The act of March 23, 1893, providing for a sale of franchises to the highest bidder, without stating other terms and conditions of sale, means, by implication, that the franchise must he sold for cash, nor does the law permit a bid in any other kind of property than money; and an agreement to pay a percentage of the gross receipts of the road, when in operation, cannot he received as a legal hid or tender under the act.
Id.—Franchise for Electric Railroad—Mandamus—Showing as to Highest Bidder.—In order to entitle a bidder for a franchise for an electric railroad under the act of March 23, 1893, to maintain a petition for a mandamus to compel the awarding of a hid to him, he must show himself to be the highest bidder for cash, and it is not sufficient that he has offered to pay a higher percentage of the gross receipts of the railroad, if another bidder has made a higher cash offer.
Garoutte, J. J. — This is a proceeding by mandate to compel the board of supervisors of Alameda county to accept the bid or tender of one Thompson, the petitioner, [555]and to declare him the highest bidder at the sale of a franchise for an electric railroad upon a certain defined route over the highways of that county. The proceedings of the board of supervisors leading up to the sale of this franchise were taken under a recent act of the legislature found in the statutes of 1893, page 288. That statute is entitled: “An act providing for the sale of railroad and other franchises in municipalities, and relative to granting franchises,” and provides: “ Every franchise or privilege to erect or lay telegraph or telephone wires, to construct or operate railroads along or upon any public street or highway, or to exercise any other privilege whatever, hereafter proposed to be granted by the board of supervisors, common council, or other governing or legislative body of any county, city and county, city, town, or district within this state, shall be granted upon the conditions in this act provided, and not otherwise.” The act then prescribes the character of notice to be given for the sale, the time of the publication thereof, and fixes the day when tenders will be received for such franchise or privilege. The concluding clause of the section is: “ The franchise or privileges must then be awarded to the highest bidder.” It is urged by respondents that the act is unconstitutional as being violative of section 24, article IV, of the constitution of this state, which declares: “Every act shall embrace but one subject, which shall be expressed in its title.” The alleged violation is claimed to consist in this: That the title refers to sales of franchises by municipalities only, while the body of the act also attempts to deal with franchises issued by counties at the hands of their respective boards of supervisors. We' have no doubt but that the word “ municipalities,” as used in the title of the act, is not broad enough to include counties, but the title proceeds further and uses the very general language, “ and relative to the granting of franchises.” These words are broad, not limited in terms to municipalities, and appear by a fair and rea[556]sonable construction to cover all the legislation found in the body of the act.
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