People v. Bendit

California Supreme Court Feb 20, 1896 No. Crim. No. 46Published

Before: McFarland

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Holding. The court held that signing an instrument as an agent for another, even without authority, does not constitute forgery because the instrument does not falsely purport to be the genuine writing of another person.

Issues

Whether the act of signing another's name as an agent, without authority, constitutes the crime of forgery.

Disposition. reversed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“A false statement of fact in the body of the instrument, or a false assertion of authority to write another’s name, or to sign his name as agent, by which a person is deceived and defrauded, is not forgery.”

“There must be a design to pass as the genuine writing of another person that which is not the writing of such other person.”

“If he sign it with his own name, per procuration of the party whom he intends to represent, it is no forgery; it is no false making of the instrument, but merely a false assumption of authority.”

Synopsis

Criminal Law — Forgery — Signature of Receipted Bill as Agent without Authority—False Pretenses.—The signature of a receipted bill, signed in the office of the debtor, by one fraudulently acting as collector without authority, who signed the name of the creditor, in liis own liandwriting, and appended initials thereto, to indicate that he signed it as agent, without attempting to simulate the handwriting of the creditor, is not an act of forgery, there being no false making or counterfeiting of the instrument, but merely a false assumption of authority and- the obtaining of money under false pretenses.

Id.—Definition of Forgery—Subjects—Counterfeiting—False Making—Code, how Differing from Common Law. — The code differs from the common law as to the enumeration of what instruments are the subjects of forgery; but does not differ from the common law as to what constitutes forgery of instruments which are the subjects of forgery; and to constitute such crime there must he a forging or counterfeiting, which is the “ false making or materially altering, with intent to defraud, of any writing which, if genuine, might apparently be of legal efficacy, or the foundation of a legal liability.”

McFarland, J. The defendant was convicted of forgery, and appeals from the judgment and from an ■order denying a new trial.

The information charges that appellant on July 30, 1894, did unlawfully, feloniously, falsely, etc., and with intent to defraud, “make and forge a certain instrument in writing, in words and figures following, to wit:

“ San Francisco, July 30, 1894.

“ G. W. Hume & Co.—William Cluff Company, wholesale grocers and provision dealers, 18 to 22 Front St-., corner Pine. Telephone 1819.

“ To balance.............

“ July '23. To bill rendered................... 15 50

“ Discount............................ .... 30

$15 20

“Wm, Cluff & Co.

“A. B.”

It further charges (in brief) that on said July 30th he willfully, fraudulently, etc., passed the said instrument “ as true and genuine,” to one J. Doming, with intent to defraud G. W. Hume and J. Doming, doing business under the firm name of G. W. Hume & Co. The instrument is admitted by appellant to be a receipt for [276]money, although there is nothing on its face which acknowledges such receipt.

We do not deem it necessary to consider the points made by appellant that the information is insufficient, and that material errors were committed by the court in rulings upon the admissibility of evidence, for in our opinion there was no evidence sufficient to establish the crime of forgery. There was a conflict of evidence as to whether appellant was the person who did the acts testified to by the witnesses for the prosecution; but assuming that plaintiff was identified as the person who did those acts, the acts themselves do not constitute the crime charged. The facts testified to were (in brief) these: The writing alleged to have been forged was sent by Wm. Cluff & Co. to Hume & Co. the day before July 30, 1894, so that the latter might examine it, and be ready to pay when the collector of the former should call for payment. It was then simply an unreceipted account with no name signed to it. On July 30th, according to the people’s testimony, appellant went to the business place of Hume & Co., and asked J. Deming, one of the partners, for the payment of this account. Deming asked him the amount, and as he did not give the correct amount Deming refused to pay. Appellant said there must be some mistake, and that he would see about it, and went out. Deming testified: “ I naturally thought he was a collector for them.” Deming afterward went out himself, leaving Fannie A. Berry as acting cashier. Afterward appellant returned, and Miss Berry paid him the amount of the account, and appellant receipted it, by writing in the presence of Miss Berry, “Wm. Cluff & Co., A. B.” She testified: “I saw him sign Wm. Cluff & Co. per A. B. I understood him to be the collector in the employ of the William Cluff Company, who came there to collect, and was authorized to collect the bill.”

People v. Bendit

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