People v. Shaw
Before: Henshaw, McFarland
Synopsis
Criminal Law—Purpose of Trial—Duty of Court to Avoid Error.— The purpose of a criminal trial is to discover and determine whether or not the defendant is guilty, and not merely to maintain at all hazards a theory of guilt, entertained beforehand; and it is the duty of the court to give the defendant a fair trial, according to the established rules of evidence, and to avoid error in respect of the rights of the accused.
Íd.—Cross-examination—Bias of Witnesses for Prosecution—Refusal to Inform Defendant-—Harmless Error.—It is legitimate, upon cross-examination of a witness for the prosecution, to show that, while he has informed the prosecution of his knowledge, he has refused to give any information to the defendant, for the purpose of showing the bias of the witness; but error in sustaining an objection to a question calling for such evidence is rendered harmless, where the witness, without further objection, answers the question fully.
Id. —Evidence Apparently Irrfjlevant—Porpose not Specified. —Where isolated questions are asked by counsel for the defendant, which are apparently irrelevant, immaterial, and aimless, and no purpose of the evidence is disclosed, it is not error to exclude the questions, although a relevant purpose might have been stated.
In.— Homicide—Cross-examination of Defendant’s Wife—Disposition of Pistol—Harmless Ruling.—Upon the trial of a defendant accused of murder, where it was admitted that defendant killed the deceased with a pistol, a ruling sustaining a question asked of his wife on cross-examination as to what she had done with the pistol with which her husband had killed the deceased, and her answer that she turned it over to one of her husband’s attorneys, could do the defendant no injury.
Id,—Adjournment of Trial—Discretion of Court,—The court may refuse to adjourn a trial from the middle of an afternoon until the next day, at the request of defendant’s counsel, where the circumstances show no abuse of discretion.
I».—Evidence—Willingness of Defendant to Surrender Himself— Advice to Contrary—Harmless Ruling. —Where there is no evidence or pretense that defendant attempted flight, he cannot be prejudiced by the exclusion of testimony that he went to a town for the purpose of surrendering himself immediately after the shooting; and that, acting on the advice of another person not to surrender himself there, he returned home, and waited for the officers to come after him.
Id.—Conduct of District Attorney—Evidence—Drinking of Beer by Defendant-—Visits of Attorney.—The action of the district attorney in offering to prove that the defendant was drinking beer on the day of the homicide, which offer was excluded as not proper cross-examination, and in asking the defendant how many times his attorneys had visited him, is not of sufficient importance to be seriously cons'idered as a ground of reversal.
Opinion — McFarland
McFarland, J. The defendant was charged with the murder of one Eugene Mason, and was convicted of murder in the second degree. He appeals from the judgment and from an order denying a motion for a new trial.
It is not seriously urged that the evidence introduced is insufficient to justify the verdict, or that the court committed any material error in the matter of instructing the jury; but it is contended that there should be a reversal on account of certain errors claimed to have been committed by the court during the progress of the [174]trial in ruling upon the admissibility of evidence. These alleged errors could and should have been avoided; but criminal cases are too often conducted upon the preconceived theory that defendant is guilty, aud that if he be given a fair trial, according to the established rules of evidence, the jury may not convict hi in. Hence embarrassing questions are frequently presented on appeal unnecessarily caused by want of ordinary care and due consideration of the rights of the accused on the part of those who conduct the trial in the court below. The purpose of a criminal trial is to discover and determine whether or not a defendant is guilty; not merely to maintain, at all hazards, a theory of guilt entertained beforehand by any one man or any community of men.
An examination of the points made in the brief of appellant show that one or two of the rulings of the court complained of were clearly erroneous, and that others, whether strictly erroneous or not, are not to be commended; but we think that it sufficiently appears that said rulings did not prejudice the appellant, or injuriously affect his substantial rights. We will notice them in detail.
1. Mrs. Mary Steele was a witness for the prosecution, and testified that an hour or two after the commission of the homicide the appellant came to her house and made some incriminating statements to her about the homicide. On cross-examination she testified that Mr. Wyatt, one of appellant’s attorneys, had called upon her and asked her what she knew about the case; and counsel for appellant asked her if she had “ refused to give him any information?” An objection by the prosecution to this question was sustained. This ruling was clearly erroneous. As tending to prove bias and feeling of the witness against appellant, it was entirely legitimate to show upon her cross-examination that, while she had evidently informed the prosecution of her knowledge, she refused to give any information to the appellant. But, notwithstanding the erroneous ruling
More from California Supreme Court
- People v. Wende (1979)
- People v. Watson (1956)
- People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996)
- People v. Kelly (2006)
- Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962)
- Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
- People v. Lewis (2021)
- In Re Estrada (1965)
- Denham v. Superior Court (1970)
- People v. Marsden (1970)