Beer v. Clifton
Before: Haynes
Synopsis
Nonnegotiable Notes — Liability of Indorser—• Agreement for Due Diligence.—The indorser of a nonnegotiable note after maturity, who did not agree or undertake to become absolutely liable upon or for the note to the indorsees, but agreed only to pay such part of the same as the indorsees should fail to collect after due diligence, is not liable thereon if due diligence was not used to collect the same.
Id.—Offset—Estoppel—Transfer of Notes as Indemnity.—The indorser is not estopped from asserting nonliability upon the nonnegotiable notes so indorsed, and not collected with due diligence, by reason of the fact that they were transferred by the indorsees as collateral security to a third party to indemnify him against his liability upon another note executed jointly by the indorsees and such third party to such indorser, as payee, nor can such indorsed notes be offset against the latter note, although it was made nonnegotiable at the request of such third party for the purposes of offset.
Id.—Notice oe Condition—Presumption—Special Agency.—The indorser is not presumed to have notice of any condition of offset imposed or attempted to be imposed by such third party as a condition of his joining in the execution of the note to the indorser, not proved to luivebeen communicated to the indorser; nor is such notice implied from the fact that notice was given by such third party of his reasons for having the note made nonnegotiable to a special agent of the express company who presented the note to him for execution, with the words or order” written therein, which were stricken out before execution.
Id.—Burden of Proof—Knowledge of Payee—Change in Form of Note.. The burden of proof is upon such third party to prove that the facts were communicated to the payee of the note, nor can the mere assent of the payee to the change in the form of the note imply that the payee had been informed thereof, or had assented to any conditions imposed for joining in the execution of the note not proved to have been made-known to the payee.
Id.—Supposed Liability of Indorser—Effect of Knowledge of Facts— Offset.—Where it appears that the third party insisted upon having, the new note executed by him made nonnegotiable merely by reason of the supposed liability of the indorser upon the other nonnegotiable notes transferred to him for indemnity, the knowledge by such indorser of the desire or purpose of the holder of the other notes to set them off upon the basis of the indorser’s liability could not affect or increase that liability; and the consent of the payee to a change in the form of the new note so as to make it nonnegotiable could only have the effect to afford to such third party an opportunity to set off against the note executed by him a.ny legal demand existing by reason of the indorsement of the- • other notes when his note becomes due, and if, at such time, or thereafter, there is no legal liability of the indorser upon the indorsed notes, there can be no offset of the same.
Haynes, C. This is an action brought upon a promissory note dated at Co velo, California, March 29, 1890, made by the defendants to the plaintiff, for the sum of three thousand five hundred dollars, with interest at the rate of ten per cent per annum, from March 16, 1889.
The case was tried before the court without a jury, and findings were filed and judgment entered for the plaintiff for the full amount of said note, with interest and costs, in all five thousand three hundred and thirty-five dollars and forty-one cents, and this appeal is from the judgment and an order denying the defendants* motion for a new trial.
Upon a first trial of this case the plaintiff had judgment for an amount much less than she claimed, and her motion for a new trial was granted, and the defendants appealed from the order granting said motion. The case upon the former appeal is reported in 98 Cal. 323; 35 Am. St. Rep. 172, where will be found a general statement of the' facts in the case. The question involved upon that appeal was as to the liability of the plaintiff upon her indorsement of eleven promissory notes then [54]overdue, and which were part of the assets sold by her to Clifton and Weill, and which she indorsed in blank.
It was there sought to hold her liable upon these notes upon said indorsement, but this court held that, inasmuch as the defendants had not made due demand on the makers for payment, and notified her of nonpayment within'a reasonable time, that she was not liable as an indorser.
Upon this trial the defendants sought to fix her liability upon another ground.
It was alleged in the answer that these eleven notes were each and all of them indorsed by plaintiff to Clifton and Weill, “ with a distinct agreement and understanding that the plaintiff would make them, and each of them, good and would pay the same, and was and would remain bound to see the same paid and pay the-same,” and that Clifton and Weill accepted said notes-with that understanding.
At the time the three thousand five hundred dollar note here in suit was made, said eleven notes were turned over to White by Clifton and Weill as collateral security against his liability upon said note, and at his dictation the words “ or order,” as it was first drawn, were stricken out so as to make it a nonnegotiable note; and this circumstance, with others, is relied upon to sustain the defense that said eleven notes were taken under an agreement with the plaintiff that she would see the same paid.
More from California Supreme Court
- People v. Wende (1979)
- People v. Watson (1956)
- People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996)
- People v. Kelly (2006)
- Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962)
- Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
- People v. Lewis (2021)
- In Re Estrada (1965)
- Denham v. Superior Court (1970)
- People v. Marsden (1970)