People v. Sternberg
Before: Henshaw
Synopsis
Criminal Law—Procuring False Registration — Accomplices—Instructions Favorable to Defendant.—A defendant accused of procuring the false registration of another person cannot complain of an instruction that the person registered and another were accomplices with him, when such declaration was asked by him in an instruction proposed by himself, and was a more favorable instruction than he was entitled to.
Id.—Person not an Accomplice—Instruction.—It is proper to instruct the jury that a person named was not an accomplice with the defendant, where there is no evidence tending to prove that he was such.
Id.—Refusal of Instructions already Given.—It is not prejudicial to the defendant to refuse instructions proposed by him, when the substance of them is fairly embraced and expressed in those given by the court.
Id.—Oral Admissions—“Distrust”—“Caution”—Erroneous Instruction.—An instruction requested by the defendant, that it is the duty of the jury to view witli “ distrust ” evidence of the oral admissions of the defendant, is properly refused as being at variance with subdivision 4 of section 2061 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which declares that such evidence is to be viewed with “ caution.”
Id.—Evidence of Accomplice—Caution and Distrust—Improper. Refusal to Instruct.—A proposed instruction to the effect that the evidence of an accomplice is to be viewed with caution and distrust, is not vitiated by the use of the word “ caution ” in addition to the word “ distrust ” employed in subdivision 4 of section 2061 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and it is error to refuse such instruction when requested by the defendant, and warranted by the evidence of accomplices, and such error is manifestly prejudicial when the court instructed the jury to judge the testimony of accomplices, when corroborated, as they did the testimony of other witnesses.
Id.—Corroborative Evidence— Definition—Instruction Requested in Language of Code—Improper Refusal__A requested instruction giving the definition of corroborative evidence, in the precise terms of section 1839 of the Code of Civil Procedure, cannot he properly refused, as being abstract; nor is error in refusing to give such instruction cured by instructing the jury as to the amount and kind of corroborative evidence required to convict, in the language of section 1111 of the Penal Code.
Henshaw, J. This casé, while possessing many features in common with the case of People v. Sternberg, Crim. No. 65, ante, p. 3, differs from it in certain essentials which demand consideration. Sternberg is here prosecuted for procuring the false registration of David Newman. Newman testified to the circumstances of his false registration at the solicitation of defendant. Lust bore like testimony, he having been present at the time [13]Sternberg induced. Newman to commit the crime. Stern-berg, when the three were together, asked them both to register from the Baldwin Hotel. They went to the registrar's office for that purpose, Sternberg accompanying them, and there did his bidding.
They recounted the later occurrences and conversation at the saloon, when twenty dollars was given them by defendant with which to get out of town, and in this they are corroborated by Gutman.
The court instructed the jury that Newman and Lust were accomplices with Sternberg. This declaration was asked by defendant in an instruction proposed by him, and was a more favorable instruction than he was entitled to. For the reasons given in People v. Sternberg, Crim. 65, ante, p. 3, the defendant cannot complain of it.
The court likewise instructed the jury that Gutman was not an accomplice. Not the slightest evidence in the case indicated that he was. This contention has also been passed upon in the other case.
Certain instructions proposed by defendant were refused by the court; but the substance of them was faixdy embraced and expressed in those given, and no injury could have resulted to defendant.
The following instructions proposed by defendant were refused by the court: “ 1. The jury is instructed that it is their duty to view with distrust evidence of the oral admissions of defendaxxt; 2. The jury is instructed that the evidence of an accomplice is to be viewed by a jmy with cautioix and distrust; 3. By corroborative evidence is xneant additional evidence of a diffei’ent character to the same poiixt.” The principles of law which these instructions undertake to express are all found in the code.
The first is at variance with the code provision which declares that evidexice of the oral adxnissions of a party is to be viewed with caution. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 2061, subd. 4.) The distinction between caution and distrust is broad enough to justify the court's refusal.
More from California Supreme Court
- People v. Wende (1979)
- People v. Watson (1956)
- People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996)
- People v. Kelly (2006)
- Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962)
- Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
- People v. Lewis (2021)
- In Re Estrada (1965)
- Denham v. Superior Court (1970)
- People v. Marsden (1970)