Ex parte Nichols
Before: McFarland
Synopsis
Constitutional Law—Preston School of Industry—Detention and Education of Minor Offenders.—The act of March 11, 1889, establishing the Preston School of Industry is constitutional, the legislature having the power to provide for the detention and education of minor offenders; and the fact that the term of detention is made greater by the judgment of the court than the term of the longest imprisonment in the county jail allowed for the same offense does not render the act invalid; nor can it be said that the punishment inflicted is greater than can be put upon an adult for the same offense, the object of the act being not punishment, but reformation, discipline, and education, and to afford the juvenile offender the opportunity and instruction to learn a trade, and to qualify himself for the duties of citizenship.
Id.—Habeas Corpus—Commitment for Petit Larceny—Jurisdiction of Justice’s Court—Felony—Transfer of Boys from State Prison. A juvenile offender sentenced by the justice’s court for petit larceny to the Preston School of Industry until he is twenty-one ye^rs of age is not punished as for a felony beyond the jurisdiction of the justice’s court; and the fact that the act provides that any boy under eighteen years of age who is serving a sentence in any state prison, who shall be deemed a fit subject for training in said school, may, upon the recommendation of the board of prison directors and the approval of the governor, be transferred to said school, and, when honorably discharged therefrom, shall be entitled to such benefits and immunities as are provided for other inmates thereof, does not turn the school into a state prison, but such transfer is in effect a commutation by the governor,' and an offender sentenced by the justice’s court cannot be released upon habeas corpus upon the ground that such transfer may be made from the state prison.
McFarland, J. The petitioner,William Nichols, asks, on a writ of habeas corpus, to be discharged, from the custody of Carl Bank, superintendent of the Preston School of Industry, situated in Amador county. He was convicted in a justice’s court of petit larceny, and, being under the age of eighteen years, the justice ad[653]judged that he was a fit subject for commitment to said school, suspended judgment, and committed him to said school until he should be twenty-one years old, unless, sooner legally discharged. The commitment was approved by the superior judge of the county, as provided by section 16 of an act entitled “An act to establish a school of industry,” approved March 11, 1889, under which act the proceedings here complained of were had-(Stats. 1889, pp. 100-06.)
Petitioner assails the constitutionality of said statute mainly upon the grounds that it is unequal in its operation, because under it an adult can be punished for petit larceny by imprisonment in the county jail for only six months, while a minor may, for the same offense, be sent to said school for a much longer period; that a justice’s court has no jurisdiction in such a case to impose imprisonment for more than six months; that the statute is a special law regulating jurisdiction of a justice’s court, etc. These and similar objections to the statute are answered against petitioner’s contention by the case of Ex parte Liddell, 93 Cal. 633. That case involved the validity of the act by which the Whittier Eeform School was established (Stats. 1889, p. 111), and its provisions, so far as these questions are concerned, are similar to those of the statute here under review. In answer to similar objections there made, this court, in Bank, through Patterson, J., said: “ There can be no question as to the power of the legislature to provide for the detention and education of juvenile offenders, as it has done in this act; and the provisions of the act are not obnoxious to the criticism that it prescribes unjust or unequal penalties. It is true the term of detention at the reform school may be made greater by the judgment of the court than the term of the imprisonment in the county jail or in the state prison for the same offense would be; but it cannot be said that the punishment inflicted is greater than could be put upon an adult for the same offense. The object of the act is not punishment, but reformation, discipline, and education. (Pen. [654]
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