Castro v. Geil
Before: Haynes
Synopsis
Quieting Title—Cross-complaint—Fraudulent Deed—Undue Influence—Unsound Mind—Pleading—Statute of Limitations—Discovert.—In an action to quiet title against the heirs of plaintiff's grantor, a cross-complaint alleging that the deed under which the plaintiff claims was obtained by undue influence at a time more than ten years prior to the filing of the cross-complaint, when the grantor was, from disease, old age, ignorance, weakness of mind and body, and from such undue influence, mentally incompetent to manage her property, or to-transact any business, and that she was then and for a long time prior thereto had been of unsound mind, and seeking to cancel the deed, but, which does not allege any date at which the fraud and undue influence was discovered, is subject to a demurrer upon the ground that the cause of action therein stated is barred by the provisions of subdivision 4 of section 338 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Id.—Allegation of Discovert Necessary.—In an action to set aside a, deed on the ground of fraud, when the acts constituting the fraud occurred more than three years before the commencement of the action, the plaintiff must allege the discovery thereof within three years, in order to avoid the bar of the statute.
Id.—Deed—Unsound Mind of Crantor—Vesting of Title—Void ability—Pleading—Limitation of Action.—A deed of a person of unsound mind, who is not under guardianship, vests a title, and is merely voidable, and not void; and the title cannot be divested otherwise than, by judicial action, or the voluntary conveyance of the grantee; and in an action to avoid it, the complaint must show upon its face that the-action is not barred by the statute of limitations.
Id.—Equity Cases—Statute of Limitations—Laches.—The statute ol limitations relating to a cause of action for relief upon the ground of fraud applies to equity cases; and where the statute is applicable tha doctrine of laches, as applied in equity, need not he considered.
Id.—Running of Statute — Minor Heirs — Subsequent Disability.— Where the parents, through whom minor heirs claim, were in life when the statute of limitations began to run against a cause of action to set aside a conveyance for fraud and undue influence, the subsequent disability of the minor children who were not heirs of the grantor when the deed was made does not stop the running of the statute, which commenced to run against their parents.
Haynes, C. This action was brought by the plaintiff to quiet his title to a lot in the town of Monterey.
[294]On December 14,1882, Maria Antonia Pico de Castro, the mother of plaintiff, executed a deed purporting to convey said property to the plaintiff in fee simple. The deed was duly acknowledged, and two days thereafter was recorded. Said Maria Antonia Pico de Castro died December 12,1883, intestate. The defendants, claiming as heirs at law of said intestate, answered the complaint, and, at the same time, filed a cross-complaint alleging “ that at the time said Maria Antonia Pico de Castro signed said deed she was, from disease, old age, ignorance, weakness of mind and body, and from the undue influence and control exercised over her by said Juan B. Castro, mentally incompetent to manage her property, or of transacting any business whatever, and was then and there incapable to comprehend or understand, and in fact did not comprehend or understand, the character, nature, or effect of said transaction,” and that she was then, and for a long time prior thereto had been, of unsound mind. Defendants further alleged that said Maria Antonia Pico de Castro died intestate on December 12, 1883, leaving surviving her, as next of kin and her only heirs entitled to inherit the premises described in the complaint, the plaintiff and the defendants; that as between the parties to the action the plaintiff was entitled to an undivided thirty-sixtieths thereof, and the several defendants, in different proportions therein stated, the remainder thereof; and prayed that said deed be set aside and canceled, and that the parties to this action be declared to be the owners in fee of said premises in the proportions above set forth, and that the plaintiff be required to convey to the defendants their said interest.
The plaintiff demurred to said cross-complaint upon the grounds: 1. That said cross-complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; and 2. That the cause of action therein stated is barred by the provision of subdivision 4 of section 338 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This demurrer was overruled, and plaintiff answered the cross-complaint, putting in issue [295]all the material allegations thereof. The cause was tried upon the cross-complaint and the answer thereto, and findings and judgment were in favor of defendants, and this appeal is by the plaintiff from said judgment and an order denying his motion for a new trial. The demurrer should have been sustained.
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