Davis v. Hinckley

California Supreme Court Nov 30, 1895 No. S. F. No. 207Published

Before: McFarland

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Holding. The court held that the appellant, having been found by the trial court to have no kinship or interest in the estate, lacked standing to challenge the distribution of the estate. Furthermore, the court affirmed the admissibility of prior judicial proceedings as evidence of the respondent's status as sole heir.

Issues

Whether the appellant, who was found to have no interest in the estate, has standing to challenge the distribution decree.
Whether the trial court properly admitted evidence of prior proceedings and judgments regarding the estate's distribution.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“the court below allowed her to introduce all the evidence she had to offer; and it found that she is in no manner akin to said Blythe, deceased, and has no interest in or claim to any of his estate.”

“Therefore, as the appellant has no interest in the estate, she is not concerned with its distribution.”

Synopsis

Estates of Deceased Persons—Determination of Heirship—Proceeding in Rem—Construction of Code.—It seems that the proceeding and decree provided for in section 1664 of the Code of Civil Procedure were intended by the legislature to be in rem, and conclusive against all persons, and the unquestioned basis for the decree of distribution which was to follow.

Id,—Decree of Distribution—Contest by Claimant—Admissibility of Proceedings to Determine Heirship.—Where an heir who has instituted prior proceedings under section 1664 of the Code of Civil Procedure petitions for a subsequent distribution of the property, and sets forth the proceedings as a basis for the decree, if a claimant who did not appear, and was not named in such proceedings, appears and contests the distribution, and joins issue upon the fact of such proceedings, the proceedings are admissible in evidence under the issues, in proof of the averments denied by the contesting claimant, without regard to the question of their conclusiveness.

Id.—Kinship of Claimant—Conclusiveness of Finding.—Where the finding of the superior court is against the kinship of the contesting claimant to the decedent, and to the effect that she has no interest in , the estate, and the testimony in favor of the claimant is of an exceedingly slight and flimsy character, the conclusion of the trial judge will not be disturbed upon appeal, but it will be considered that she has no interest in the estate, and is not concerned with its distribution.

McFarland, J. This is an appeal by Sarah Davis from a decree of distribution to Florence Blythe Hinckley of the property and estate of Thomas H. Blythe, deceased.

The said Blythe died intestate in April, 1883. Letters of administration upon his estate were issued in that year to Philip A. Roach, who was afterward succeeded by others as administrators. More than one year after the issuance of letters the respondent herein, Florence Blythe Hinckley, then Florence Blythe, commenced proceedings, under section 1664 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to have the claims of all persons to said estate, and its distribution, ascertained and declared in the manner provided by that section. She filed her petition in October, 1885, claiming to be the daughter and sole heir of said deceased, and entitled to the distribution of his whole estate. The court duly made an order requiring all persons, named or unnamed, to appear on February 1,1886, and exhibit their claims of heirship, ownership, or interest in said estate, which was duly published; and on said day nearly two hundred persons appeared claiming such heirship. Within the time prescribed by law said Florence filed her complaint, setting forth the facts constituting her heirship to the deceased and her claim to said estate; and the numerous persons who had appeared filed pleadings, or “ answers," as they are called in the section, setting up the facts constituting their claims to heirship and distribution. They are mostly associated in certain groups, and their claims were mostly inconsistent with and hostile to each other, each group contending that the deceased was descended from parents different from those alleged by either oí the other claimants. After various proceedings not [233]necessary to be mentioned here, and after a full hearing and trial, the court, in October, 1890, made its decision, and entered its decree or judgment, by which it was adjudged and decreed that the said Florence was the daughter of said deceased, and his sole heir, and therefore entitled to the distribution of the whole of said estate, and that neither of the said persons appearing as aforesaid, nor any other person, was heir to said deceased or entitled to any of said estate. From this judgment various appeals were taken, but, upon all the appeals, the judgment was affirmed. (See Blythe v. Ayres, 102 Cal. 254; also eight other cases there mentioned; Blythe v. Ayres, 96 Cal. 532; Hinckley v. Ayres, 105 Cal. 357.) Two of the persons who appeared and answered and took appeals, as above stated, were William Savage and his brother, David Savage; and these two were brothers of the appellant, Sarah Davis. These two brothers, during the above-mentioned proceedings, presented and contested for the claim of the group called the “ London Savages”; and this appellant, although she knew that this claim, in which she was interested jointly with her brothers, was thus being litigated, and gave testimony, by a deposition, for her brothers in support of that claim, did not appear as a party; and she now claims the right to open up and again contest for the said alleged London Savage heir-ship, and to disregard all the proceedings and decisions above mentioned—which after full and protracted litigation resulted in the judicial determination of all said conflicting claims in favor of said Florence—upon the ground that there was no legal service upon appellant of the notice of said proceeding, because she was not individually named in said notice or in an affidavit for publication. Of course, under these circumstances, she is entitled to no equitable consideration, and must stand upon her strict legal rights, if any such she has.

Davis v. Hinckley

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