Knowlton v. Mackenzie

California Supreme Court Nov 27, 1895 No. No. 15304Published

Before: Harrison

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Holding. The court held that a trial court lacks authority to modify a judgment after its entry except through a motion for a new trial or appeal, and that an attorney cannot consent to an increase in a client's liability without express authorization.

Issues

Whether a trial court may modify a judgment after its entry without a motion for a new trial or appeal.
Whether an attorney has the authority to consent to an increase in a client's judgment liability without the client's express consent.
Whether a judgment against an assignee should be entered against them in their representative capacity.

Disposition. remanded

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“The subsequent modification of the judgment was unauthorized. After the court had rendered judgment in accordance with its findings, such judgment could be changed only through a motion for a new trial, or upon appeal.”

Synopsis

Judgment against Assignee of Insolvent — Payment to Assignor oi> Claimant — Finding of Fact among Conclusions of Law—Conolusiveness upon Appeal.—Where judgment was rendered against an assignee for the benefit of creditors of an insolvent stockbroker, in favor of an intervening creditor, for the difference between the amount realized by the assignee from the sale of stocks belonging to the intervenor’s assignor, and a sum of money deducted therefrom on account of moneys received by such assignor, the finding that such sum was to be deducted from such amount is a finding of fact, although placed after the conclusions of law; and, in the'absence of the evidence presented thereon in a statement or bill of exceptions, such finding of fact is conclusive upon, appeal.

Id.—Unauthorized Modification of Judgment. — After the court has rendered judgment in accordance with its findings, neither the findings nor the judgment can be changed except through a motion for a new trial, or upon appeal, and the court loses all power to change its findings of fact after the entry of judgment, in the absence of a motion for a new trial, and has no power, in the absence of such motion, to modify the judgment drawn from the findings of fact as made.

Id.—Stipulation for Modification of Judgment—Statement of Attorney.—Where some of the parties to the action stipulated for a modification of the judgment, but the attorney for the appellant expressly' refused to sign any stipulation, and merely verbally expressed the willingness of his client to obey the order of the court, such statement is not the equivalent of a stipulation, and does not prevent his client from objecting upon appeal to the want of authority in the court to modify the judgment.

Id.—Authority of Attorney to Bind Client—Presumption—Knowledge of Client’s Instructions.—Although, as a general rule, a stipulation of an attorney will be presumed to have been authorized by the client, yet, when the adverse party, as well as the court, is aware that the attorney is acting in direct opposition to his client’s instructions or wishes, the reason of the rule ceases, and the court ought not to act upon the stipulation, nor can the adverse party claim the right to enforce a judgment rendered by reason thereof.

Id.—Consent to Modification of Judgment—Authority of Attorney. For the purpose of prosecuting and defending an action the authority of an attorney ordinarily terminates with the entry of judgment except for the purpose of enforcing it, or seeking to have it set aside of reversed; and, when the judgment has once been entered under the direction of the court, the rights of the client have been determined, and the attorney ceases to have any authority to consent to its modification, to the prejudice of the client, without his consent.

Harrison, J. The defendant Mackenzie was engaged as a stockbroker in San Francisco, and on the 3d of December, 1886, made an assignment for the benefit of his creditors to C. H. Kaufman, the appellant herein, under the provisions of title III, part II, division' IV, of the Civil Code, and on the same day transferred to him ■certain money and other personal property. Included in the property so transferred were certain mining stocks belonging to M. H. McDonald, which were subsequently sold by Kaufman under directions from one Scott, to whom McDonald had transferred her claim agáinst Mackenzie, and for which Kaufman realized'the sum of $5,316.55. The court found that the sum of $1,494.03, which had been received by McDonald from Kaufman, should be considered as a payment upon this claim, and found, as a conclusion of law, “ that the intervenor, George O. Davis, is entitled to a judgment against the defendant C. H. Kaufman, assignee of John Mackenzie, in the sum of $3,822.52.” Davis was the successor in interest through Scott to the claim of McDonald, and had filed a complaint in intervention in the action. These findings of the court were filed January 21, 1889, and judgment thereon was signed and filed on the same day, and entered of record January 31, 1889, by which it was adjudged “ that the intervenor, George O. Davis, do have and recover of and from the defendant O. H. [186]Kaufman the sum of $3,822.52.” May 24, 1889, the court made an order, which was entered in its minutes, that the judgment be modified “ by striking out therefrom $3,822.52, and substituting in lieu thereof $5,769.52, so that the said George 0. Davis shall have and recover of and from the said C. H. Kaufman the sum of $5,769.52 instead of the sum of $3,822.52,” and that said modification be made nunc pro tunc of the 31st of January, 1889, and that the clerk of the court make an entry thereof in the original judgment entered in the judgment-book. Thereupon the clerk drew a line, in red ink, upon the face of the judgment, through the figures $3,822.52, and inserted directly after them, in red ink, the figures $5,769.52, and wrote on the margin, “Modified by the order of court, May 24, 1889.” From this judgment Kaufman has appealed upon the judgment-roll alone, without any bill of exceptions.

1. The finding that Kaufman realized the sum of $5,316.55 from the sale of the stocks belonging to McDonald, the respondent’s assignor, is the basis of the judgment against him, and, in the absence of any qualifying finding of fact, would have authorized a judgment against him for that amount. The further finding that of the moneys received by McDonald the sum of $1,494.03 Was to be deducted from this amount, and that the remainder of the moneys received by her were to be treated as a dividend upon her general claim against Mackenzie, must be regarded upon this appeal as authorized by the evidence before the trial court. If the appellant would question the conclusion of this finding, it was incumbent upon him to except thereto, and have the evidence thereon presented in a statement or bill of exceptions. This finding is placed after the conclusions of law, and is given as a fact resulting from the other findings of fact, but does not cease to be a finding of fact by reason of its position. Upon the findings, therefore, the court was authorized to render the judgment which was originally given and entered in favor of the intervenor.

Knowlton v. Mackenzie

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