Smith v. Hawkins
Synopsis
Water Rights—Appropriation—Excess op Water—Finding against Evidence.—Where the plaintiff claims the waters of a creek by virtue of a prior appropriation, and the defendant by a subsequent diversion and prescriptive right, a finding that, during the time the defendant has diverted the water, an excess has flowed in the creek above the ca. paeity of both ditches, is not sufficiently supported by the mere observation of the trial judge who visited the premises once near the close of the rainy season, just prior to the judgment, where the other uncontradicted evidence adduced upon the trial shows that all of the water of the creek was taken in one of the ditches during one season.
Id.—Rights op Appropriator op Water—License—Easement—Congressional Grant.—An appropriator of water which is conveyed across the public domain is a licensee of the general government; hut when such part of the public domain passes into private ownership, it is burdened by the easement granted by the United States to the appropriator, who holds his rights against the land under an express grant of Congress by the act of 1866.
Id.—Acquisition of Prescriptive Right.—A prescriptive right cannot be acquired against the United States, and can be acquired only by one claimant against another private individual; and one who claims a right by prescription must use the water continuously, uninterruptedly, and adversely for a period of at least five years, after which time the law will conclusively presume an antecedent grant to him of his asserted right.
Id.—Construction op Code—Extinguishment op Servitude Acquired by Enjoyment—Prescriptive Right.—Section 811 of the Civil Code, which provides that when a servitude is acquired by enjoyment, disuse thereof by the owner of the servitude for the period prescribed for acquiring title by enjoyment extinguishes the servitude, deals only with the extinguishment of servitudes resting upon prescriptive right, and not of one conferred by express grant from the United States to a prior appropriator.
Id.—Disuse op Water Appropriated—Forfeiture op Right—Period op Disuse—Construction op Code.—Section 1411 of the Civil Code, which declares that the appropriation of water must he for some useful or beneficial purpose, and that, when the appropriator, or his successor in interest, ceases to use it for such purpose, the right ceases, deals with the forfeiture of the right by nonuser alone as distinguished from abandonment; and, by analogy, this section must he construed as making a cessation of the use by the appropriator work a forfeiture of his right, -• where there is a failure to make any beneficial use of the water for a period of more than five years, and, in such case, a subsequent appro- ■ priator for a beneficial use acquires a right to the water.
The Court. Action begun in October, 1892, to quiet, the alleged title of plaintiffs to a dam, ditch, and water right for the diversion of the waters of Wolf creek in Nevada county. As early as the year 1862 one John Ross was in possession of the ditch and sold water from the same. The ditch claimed by plaintiff? is two-thirds of a mile in length; its original capacity was four hundred and fifty-seven inches of water, though it seems to be now so filled up as to be capable of carrying about one hundred inches only. Plaintiffs claim in virtue of a deed to them executed by Ross in March, 1888, which, for the purposes of the decision, we shall assume was sufficient to convey his title to the property in dispute» Since the year 1875 taxes have been annually assessed, against such property and paid by Ross and his sue[124]cessors, the plaintiffs. In 1890 it was leased by plaintiffs to persons who made no use of it, but who paid two months’ rental therefor at fifteen dollars per month.
Defendant owns a piece of land lying below the head of the Ross ditch and riparian to said creek; one-fourth of a mile of the length of such ditch is on defendant’s said land, and was there constructed before defendant settled on the same; he having acquired title to the land under the federal homestead laws, the patent therefor was issued to him in 1891. In 1879 the defendant constructed a ditch tapping the creek about fifty feet below the Ross dam and having a capacity of two hundred inches of water under six-incfi pressure; and, by that means, for thirteen years next before the commencement of this action, continuously, uninterruptedly, with a claim of right, peaceably, and with the knowledge of plaintiffs and said Ross, defendant diverted such water to the extent of the capacity of his ditch, and used the same for agricultural purposes on his said land. For the period of five years and more next before the commencement of the action, the dam, ditch, and water right claimed by plaintiffs have not been used by Ross, or any one who has succeeded to his interest, for any useful or beneficial purpose; neither he nor they have ever owned any property below the head of that ditch to which the water could be applied; for any purpose of profit its use was contingent on its sale or rental to other persons; and this occurred very infrequently. The court found that plaintiffs are the owners of the property claimed by them; that enough water flows in the creek to fill both ditches to their full capacity; that the use of the water by defendant has not been adverse; that his rights to the water are subordinate to those of plaintiffs; and gave judgment in plaintiffs’ favor. We think these conclusions are contrary to the evidence in several particulars.
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