White v. Superior Court
Before: Fleet
Synopsis
Cep.tiorari—Jurisdiction—Errors not Revibwablb.—Upon certiorari the single question involved is whether the lower court has exceeded its jurisdiction; and, if it has not, no matter how grievously it may have erred, either in matters of fact or matters of law, the writ of certiorari will not afford relief to the party prejudiced; and, where recitals of fact in the judgment or order are sufficient to sustain it, those recitals are conclusive, and no evidence can be received to impeach them.
erty Rights.—The court having jurisdiction of an action for divorce, has power to put a proper restraint upon the disposition of property by the husband, pending the final determination of the rights of the parties therein; and, where the decree of divorce reserving property rights for future consideration enjoins the husband from making any disposition of his property until the final decree is entered, the court has power to punish him for contempt in making leases of his land in violation of the injunction, and interfering with and obstructing the receiver appointed by the court in his efforts to take possession of the property; and certiorari will not lie to review any error in the injunction order which, could have been corrected by appeal, nor any question of fact passed upon in the proceedings for contempt. Id.—Proceedings for Contempt—Divorce—Decree Respecting Prop-
Id.—Former Adjudication—Jeopardy—Power of Court.—The defense of a former adjudication does not go to the jurisdiction of the court, and when the question of whether the contempt charge has been before adjudicated, or whether the petitioner has been twice in jeopardy for the acts of which he was convicted of contempt, the court has the same power to pass upon it as upon any other question in the case; and any error in its ruling cannot be reviewed upon certiorari.
Id.—Transfer of Divorce Case—Violation of Rule.—The fact that the divorce action in which the proceedings for contempt were had was transferred by the presiding judge from one department of the superior court to another, in violation of a rule of court, does not involve the question of jurisdiction, nor render the judgment void.
Id.—Departments of Superior Court — Jurisdiction — Transfer of Case—Constitutional Law.—The jurisdiction of causes is vested by the constitution in the superior court and not in any particular judge or department thereof, although it provides that there may be as many sessions of the court at the same time as there are judges, yet, whether sitting separately or together, the judges hold but one and the same court, and the division into departments is purely imaginary, and for the conveniences of business and of designation; and transferring a cause from one department to another does not effect a change or transfer of the jurisdiction, which remains at all times in the court as a single entity.
Van Fleet, J. Application for certiorari to review an order of said court, Department Four thereof, adjudging petitioner guilty of contempt.
In the case of George E. White v. Frankie White, pending in said superior court, wherein petitioner is the [63]plaintiff, the superior court entered a decree divorcing the parties, and, =by said decree, after reserving the property rights of the parties for future consideration, it is provided:
“ That until the further, supplemental, and final decree aforesaid is duly entered, recorded, and carried into effect, the plaintiff, his agents, attorneys, trustees, employees, and servants, and each of them, be, and they hereby are, enjoined and restrained from selling, conveying, alienating, assigning, transferring, mortgaging, hypothecating, encumbering, or in any manner disposing of, embarrassing, complicating, or affecting the community property of the plaintiff and the defendant, real and personal, or any part or portions thereof, and his own separate property, real and personal, including all moneys and securities the plaintiff has on hand, and the income derived from said property, or any part or portions thereof, except that plaintiff may be permitted to pursue and carry on his usual and ordinary business, and with respect to the whole of said property, from doing, br permitting, or suffering to be done, any act or acts in violation of the rights, or any of them, of the defendant respecting the subject of this action, or tending to render the judgment or decree in favor of the defendant, or any part thereof, ineffectual.”
Subsequent to the entry of said decree the superior court appointed a receiver in said action, and directed him to take possession and control of all the property of petitioner, and hold it subject to the direction and control of the court. The proceeding for contempt against petitioner was commenced since the making of the decree and order aforesaid, and the acts charged as constituting such contempt were in making two certain leases of his lands, in violation of the injunction contained in said decree, and in interfering with and obstructing the receiver in the efforts of the latter to take possession of said property. Petitioner, having been duly cited and tried, was found guilty of the acts charged, and it was adjudged that they constituted a [64]
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