In re Patton
Before: Vanclief
Synopsis
Insolvency—Petition of Creditors—Sufficiency of Pleading—Fraudulent Transfer.—Under section 8 of the Insolvent Act, which prescribes what facts the petition of creditors against an insolvent debtor shall set forth, a petition alleging a transfer of the property of the insolvent with intent to hinder, delay, and defraud his creditors, and setting forth the name of the grantee, with the circumstances of time, place, and general description of the property sold, is sufficient, and is not demurrable because the allegations of fraud are not made more specific; and where the petition also alleges that the respondent, being insolvent, and in contemplation of insolvency, sold and conveyed a stock of merchandise, in the petition described, it sufficiently states an act of insolvency on the part of the respondent, entitling the creditors to an adjudication of his insolvency.
Vanclief, C. The requisite number of the creditors of J. A. Patton petitioned the superior court of Glenn county that he be adjudged insolvent and required to surrender his estate for the benefit of his creditors, and he was ordered to show cause why the petition should not be granted. In response to the order he demurred to the petition, on the grounds that it “ does not state facts sufficient to constitute an act of insolvency on the part of said respondent, and does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against respondent.”
The court sustained the demurrer, and the petitioners [35]declining to amend their petition, judgment passed for defendant dismissing the petition, and for costs.
The petitioners bring this appeal upon the judgment-roll.
The petition states two grounds, or acts of the respondent, upon which the petitioners pray that he may be adjudged insolvent, as follows:
1. “That said J. A. Patton did heretofore, to wit, on or about the 20th day of July, 1894, at the town of Willows, county of Glenn, state of California, make a transfer of his property, with intent to hinder, delay, and defraud his creditors; that is to say, being then and: there possessed of a stock of merchandise, consisting of dry goods, fancy goods and furnishing goods, boots and shoes, clothing, hats and caps, groceries and tobacco, and similar goods, contained in his store conducted by him at said town of Willows, being indebted to the peti-; tioners herein, the said respondent, J. A. Patton, did transfer said stock of merchandise and property unto one E. D. Fry, with the intent aforesaid.
“ That said J. A. Patton was, and at all the times herein mentioned, and now is, insolvent, and has not sufficient property with which to satisfy the claims and demands of petitioners.”
2. “ That said respondent, on or about the 20th day of July, 1894, at the town of Willows, county of Glenn, state aforesaid, being insolvent and in contemplation of insolvency, did make a grant, sale, conveyance, and transfer of a certain stock of merchandise, consisting of dry goods, fancy goods, and furnishing goods, boots and shoes, clothing, hats and caps, groceries and tobacco, and similar goods, then and there belonging to and used in the business conducted by him at said Willows, unto one E. D. Fry.
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