California National Bank v. Ginty
Before: Fleet
Synopsis
Promissory Note—Principal and Surety.—One who signs a promissory note as a principal is liable as such to the payee, notwithstanding the latter knew that as between the one thus signing and the principal debtor the former was in fact only a surety.
Id.—National Bank—Rate of Interest. — Under section 5197 of the United States Revised Statutes, and section 1918 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a national bank situated and doing business in this state is authorized to charge and receive such rate of interest as may be agreed upon. ■
Debtor and Creditor — Collateral Security—Application of Security.—Where a creditor holds two notes or obligations, one better secured than the other, and has collateral security for both alike, he has a right, in the absence of any modifying agreement, to have the collateral applied upon the obligation which is most precarious by reason of being least secured.
Id.—Renewal of Obligation.—Certain property was pledged for the security of a debt evidenced by a note signed by three persons as principals. Subsequently a part payment of the debt was made, and for the balance two notes were given, one of which was signed by all of the parties to the original note and the other by only one of them. After the first delivery of the property in pledge no change was made by the parties as to the purposes or conditions upon which it was pledged. Held, That the pledged property should be applied to the payment of the note having the single maker, and that the right of the payee of the notes to such application was not affected by the fact that, as between themselves, two of the makers of the first note were sureties for the other, and that the pledge was intended to be security for their protection as such sureties.
Practice—New Trial—Jüdgmekt. —A motion for a new trial is not necessary to review an objection to a judgment which appears upon the face of the findings.
Van Fleet, J. Action to recover on two promissory notes, one for seven thousand three hundred and fifty dollars, dated December 20, 1890, due in six months, with interest at ten per centum per annum, signed by Livingston, Clarke & Co., John Ginty, and M. A. Luce; and the second for five thousand dollars, of even date with the first and like rate of interest, due three months from date, signed by Livingston, Clarke & Co. only; and to subject certain primavera logs, pledged as security for the payment of said notes, to sale, and the application of the proceeds to the satisfaction of the indebtedness. Judgment went for plaintiff for the amount of the notes and interest as stipulated, and directing a sale of the logs.
There are cross-appeals, the defendants Ginty and Luce appealing from the judgment and an order denying them a new trial, and the plaintiff appealing from that part of the judgment which directs the manner in which the proceeds of the pledged property shall be applied.
The appeal of Ginty and Luce involves but two [150]questions: 1. Whether they were .correctly held to be principals upon the note signed by them; and 2. Whether the court below ruled properly in allowing interest on said note. The defense relied upon by them was that they signed the note for seven thousand three hundred and fifty dollars, as sureties for Livingston, Clarke & Co., with the knowledge of that fact by plaintiff, and with the understanding that plaintiff was to hold them as sureties only; that plaintiff had released Livingston, one of the principals on said note, and that they as sureties were thereby discharged of any liability. The court found that, as to plaintiff, Ginty and Luce executed the note as principals thereon, and that plaintiff dealt with them as principals and not as sureties; that as between Livingston, Clarke & Co. and Ginty and Luce the latter were sureties, and that this fact was known to plaintiff at the time of the execution of the note. The court also found that the release of Livingston was with the consent of Ginty and Luce. It is contended by these appellants that the evidence is insufficient to support the finding that they executed the note as principals and that the plaintiff dealt with them as such. An examination of the evidence satisfies us that this contention cannot obtain. Indeed, taking all the circumstances attending upon the transaction from its origin into consideration, and it is doubtful if an opposite conclusion to that reached by the trial court could find substantial sanction in the evidence. However that may be, there is at least a substantial conflict on the point, and under the well-settled rule of this court the finding cannot be disturbed. It is further urged, however, that the fact that plaintiff was aware at the execution of the note that these defendants were merely sureties for Livingston, Clarke & Co. was sufficient of itself, independently of any agreement by plaintiff to that effect, to make said defendants sureties as to the plaintiff. We do not understand such to be the law. To the contrary, we understand the rule to be that where one signs as principal he will be held as
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