In re Estate of Smith
Before: Henshaw
Synopsis
Will—Construction—Disposition of Community Property—Election of Widow.—Of two permissible constructions of a will that which favors the conclusion that the testator is disposing only of his own half of the community property will be adopted; but where the testator undertakes in terms to dispose of all the property of the community, and declares that the will is made with full knowledge of the property rights of the husband and wife, and with her consent, though such declaration does not bind the wife, it is sufficient to put her to an election whether or not to take under the will.
Id.—Time of Election—Distribution of Estate—Previous Election— Estoppel.—The widow may elect to take her half of the community property upon distribution of the estate, unless by former acts in dealing with the property she is estopped from making it, by a previous election to take under the will, and such previous election is to be tested by the rules of estoppel.
Id.—Findings—Election to Take Under Will—Conclusion of Law.— Where the court finds the acts of the widow, from which it concludes that she had elected to take under tha will, the result reached is properly placed among the conclusions of law, and if regarded as a finding, it being declared by the court to be drawn from the facts previously stated, if those facts do not support the conclusion it must fall.
Id.—Facts Creating Estoppel to Elect upon Distribution.—Before the widow can be denied her right to elect upon distribution to take her half of the community property it must be found that, with the knowledge of her rights, by unequivocal acts evincing her intent, she has so dealt with the property left her by the will, that it would be inequitable to permit her to avoid those acts and disclaim her intent.
Id.—Acts not Establishing Estoppel—Conveyance oe Life Estate— Declaration—Knowledge of Facts.—The conveyance by the widow of “all her interest in the property mentioned in the will as vesting a life estate therein upon the widow, ” to the sons of her deceased daughter, and a declaration to one of her grandsons that she wished the will to stand, are not sufficient to establish an implied election, or election by estoppel, to take under the will, it not appearing clearly that she recognized by her deed the life estate in the land devised to her, or that she had full knowledge of the facts concerning the properties and of her right to elect at the time she made the statement to her grandson. Estates of Deceased Persons—Presentation of Claims—Death of Coexeoütor—Debt to Estate—Distribution—Offset.—Where one of two executors of the estate of a deceased person dies, having in his hands a portion of the funds of the estate, which could not he identified as a trust fund, it is necessary that a claim should be presented against his estate by the remaining executor of the estate of the original decedent; and, if the time has expired for presenting claims against the estate of the deceased executor, the amount due from him to the estate of the original decedent cannot he deducted from his distributive share of that estate.
Henshaw, J. Appeals by the administrator with the will annexed, and by the widow, from the order settling the administrator’s final account, and from the decree of distribution.
Robert Smith died in April, 1891, and by his last will bequeathed one dollar to each of his four grandchildren, and the residue of his personal property among certain of his children; to his son William R., four-tenths thereof; to his son John A., three-tenths thereof; to his daughter, Jessie, three-tenths thereof.
Said will provided as follows:
“ Thirdly, I give and bequeath to my daughter, Mrs. Mary Cardiff, now of San Benito county, California, a life estate in my home ranch, in San Benito county, California, the same being described as follows, to wit: Being the southwest quarter of section 6, tp. 15 S., range 7 E., M. D. M., also all livestock, farming utensils, household furniture, and in fact all personal property that may be on said ranch, excepting money on hand, securities, and other evidences of money due me, to have and hold and use during her natural life as her own, and at her death to pass in fee to her sons, Robert Cardiff and Geo. H. Cardiff, and to their heirs in fee [118]simple. But in the event I survive my said daughter Mary Cardiff, then at my death said property to pass directly to her said sons, Robert and George Cardiff. This bequest, however, is not to take effect during the. lifetime of my wife, Mary Smith, who is now residing with me on the above-described property; and, in the event she survives me, she is to have full and free use and absolute control of said real property and personal herein referred to, and after her death to pass as above provided. This is made with full knowledge of property rights of husband and wife, and with the knowledge and consent of my said wife.”
The sons John A. and William R. were named as executors; both qualified, and both, after service, died before settlement of their accounts.
In July, 1893, the Robert Cardiff above named was appointed administrator with the will annexed, and in December of the same year filed, with his final account, a petition praying for its settlement and the distribution of the estate.
In January next the widow of the testator filed her written claim and notice that all of the property of her husband was community property, and that she claimed one-half thereof as being beyond his power of testamentary disposition.
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