Millett v. Lagomarsino

Temple, J. Action brought to quiet title. The answer denies plaintiffs’ ownership and avers title in one of the defendants, John B. Cronan, under whom the other defendant holds.

Plaintiff recovered judgment, the court finding the allegations of the complaint true, and all the allegations of the answer untrue.

Plaintiffs’ sole claim of title is from adverse possession.

The lot in question is known as lot 2, and is one of many lots comprising about ten acres, which belonged at one time to the City Extension Homestead Association, and which, with other lands, were subdivided by the association prior to 1870.

Lot 2 was conveyed to John Tenney by the association prior to 1873, and the others to different owners. Lot 2 was one hundred feet square.

In November, 1873, Michael Millett entered into possession of the ten-acre tract and other lands under a lease for three years, executed by ten owners of lots in the tract, or in some portion of the lands formerly owned by the association, for the lease included other lands besides the ten-acre tract, which last-mentioned tract, however, was inclosed by itself.

The lessors did not claim undivided interests in the demised premises, but each owned the land which had been conveyed to him by the association. The lease was in writing, and purported to lease to Millett their [105]interest in the lands known as the City Extension Homestead Association. Millett remained in possession of the premises up to some time in 1891, when lot 2 was entered upon by defendant Lagomarsino, who claimed under defendant Cronan, who had obtained a deed for the lot from John Tenney.

For the first three years Millett paid rent as stipulated in his lease; after that he still retained possession, but paid no rent.

In July, 1882, Millett obtained a deed for the lot from one Jason Wight, who had purchased the property at a tax sale, although it does not appear that a tax deed was ever executed to him; Millett recorded this deed, and then—as plaintiff contends—commenced to assert title to the land and to hold the same adversely to all the world.

Appellants contend that as Millett entered into possession as a tenant, he cannot initiate an adverse possession without first surrendering possession to his landlord; and further, that, if he can do so, Tenney and his grantees should have some notice of the change in the manner in which Millett was holding before his possession could become adverse to Tenney, so as to set the statute of limitations in operation.