Stinchfield v. Gillis

Harrison, J. Upon the former appeal in this case (96 Cal. 33) it appeared that the Carrington mine was a single claim held by the defendant Gillis, of which he had sold a portion to the plaintiff, and it was held that by virtue of his deed to the plaintiff Gillis was es-topped from questioning the right of his grantee to all of the gold found within the surface lines of the deed, irrespective of the depth below the surface at which it was found. After the case went down to the superior court for another trial the defendants amended their answers, presenting issues to the effect that the tract of ground which was sold to the plaintiff was known as the Pine Tree claim, and was distinct from that known as the Carrington claim, which was retained by Gillis, and had been located subsequent to the location of the Carrington claim; that upon these facts they were entitled to the gold found at the place of intersection of the Rice vein and the West vein, although that place of intersection was within the surface lines of the grant to the plaintiff. Upon the issues thus presented, the court found that for nearly fourteen years prior to the sale to the plaintiff the mining ground held by the defendant Gillis, including that sold to the plaintiff, as well as that retained by himself, had been held and claimed by him as a single mining claim, and was known and designated, as the “ Carrington” claim, and that during this time no Pine Tree mine or claim had existed; that prior to the sale and conveyance to the plaintiff, Gillis had pointed out to him the boundaries of the Carrington claim, and told him that the ground so sold and conveyed was a part of that claim; that before the execution of the deed Gillis and the plaintiff went together upon the ground and marked off and agreed upon the' [87]portion of the claim to be sold to the plaintiff, and established visible monuments at each of the four corners, and agreed upon the dividing line between the portion to be sold to the plaintiff and the portion to be retained by the defendant, and established and agreed upon permanent monuments marking said dividing line; that the ground was conveyed according to these monuments, and in the conveyance to the plaintiff was designated as the Pine Tree mine for the purpose of distinguishing it from the remaining part of the Carrington claim retained by Gillis. In 1854 the Carrington claim was located for one thousand feet in length, and one hundred feet on each side of the vein, and in 1859 or 1860 T. E. Carrington, then being in possession of the Carrington claim, posted notices on the Pine Tree vein, adjacent thereto on the east, claiming three hundred feet along said vein. Carrington remained in possession of this property until some time in 1870, when he moved away from the county, leaving the whole of the mining ground in charge of one Stoker, and instructed him to do the assessment work thereon. Stoker took possession of the entire ground in which the Carrington and Pine Tree veins lay, and held it for Carrington as one claim until June, 1872; and during this time the entire ground was held and known as the Carrington claim, and all the assessment work that was done upon the ground was done as and for the Carrington claim. In June, 1872, Carrington sold to the defendant Gillis his interest in the mining ground—including in the deed of conveyance claims on all sides of the Pine Tree mine, but not mentioning any claim or mining ground by that name—and upon the execution of this deed Stoker turned over to Gillis the possession of all the ground that he had been holding for Carrington; and Gillis remained in possession thereof until his conveyance to the plaintiff in 1886. Upon these facts the court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The defendants have appealed.