Goodwin v. Scheerer

California Supreme Court Apr 3, 1895 No. No. 15560Published

Before: Harrison

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Holding. In an action of ejectment, proof of prior undisturbed possession is sufficient to establish a prima facie case for recovery, and the burden shifts to the defendant to prove a superior right to possession. The court will not take judicial notice that specific land is part of a city's pueblo grant or reserved for public use to defeat a plaintiff's established possessory interest.

Issues

Whether a plaintiff in ejectment must affirmatively prove that land is not reserved for public use by the city.
Whether the court should take judicial notice that specific land is part of the pueblo lands confirmed to the city of San Francisco.
Whether prior undisturbed possession is sufficient to establish a prima facie case for recovery in ejectment against a defendant claiming under a city lease.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“The possession of land is itself prima facie evidence of ownership, and in an action of ejectment proof of such possession prior to the intrusion of the defendant is, in the absence of any evidence in support of the defendant’s right to possession, sufficient to authorize a judgment of recovery.”

Synopsis

Ejectment—Possession op Plaintiff—Evidence of Ownership.—In an action of ejectment, the possession of the land in controversy by the plaintiff prior to the intrusion of the defendant is, in the absence of any evidence in support of the defendant’s right to the possession, sufficient to authorize a judgment of recovery.

Id.—Proof op Prescriptive Title—Burden op Proof.—If the plaintiff shows that his possession has been continued for a period long enough to bar an action for recovery he establishes a title by prescription, and, upon such proof, the burden is thrown upon the defendant to show his right to retain the possession.

Id.—Possession op Mission Creek Land—Lease from City to Depend-ant—Failure to Prove Title.—In an action by a plaintiff, who, for more than five years, was the possessor of a parcel of land, claimed by the city of San Francisco, against a defendant who took forcible possession of the land, claiming under a lease from the city of San Francisco, and also against the city and county of San Francisco, where the only proof for the defendants was oral testimony of the lease from the city to the intruder, without proof of the lease, and without any evidence given in support of the right of the city to make the lease, except the oral testimony of a witness that the property was part of the Old Mission, or Channel, creek land reclaimed by the city, and that it had always been understood that it was city property, there is not sufficient proof of any title or right of possession in the defendants, and the plaintiff is entitled to a recovery of the lands.

Id.—Judicial Notice—Pueblo Lands.—The court cannot take judicial notice in an action of ejectment that the land in question is part of the pueblo lands which were confirmed to the city of San Francisco by the decree of the circuit court of the United States; nor can the court judicially know that the defendant’s claim to the demanded land is derived through the decree of the circuit court.

Id.—Possession Under Van Ness Ordinance—Presumption—Burden op Proof.—There is no presumption that any portion of the land covered by the Van Ness ordinance was or was not in the actual possession of any one during the period provided for in the ordinance; but, in any legal proceeding in which the fact whether a particular parcel of land was or was not then held in actual possession becomes material, it must he established by that party who relies upon the fact as an affirmative issue in support of his claim or defense.

Harrison, J. Ejectment for certain lands in the city and county of San Francisco. The cause was tried [693]by the court without a jury, findings of fact were waived, and judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff. A motion for a new trial was denied, and from this order and the judgment the defendants have appealed.

The evidence offered by the plaintiff showed that his grantors had been in the undisturbed possession and occupancy of different parcels of the land described in the complaint—one of them from April, 1885, and the other from July, 1885, until December, 1890—when the defendant Scheerer took forcible possession of the entire land and ousted them therefrom, and remained in possession until after the commencement of this action. The action is brought against Scheerer and the city and county of San Francisco. The defendant Scheerer testified that a short time before taking possession he had obtained a lease of the property from the board of supervisors of the city, and had been put in possession thereof by the deputy superintendent of streets. The lease itself was not offered in evidence, nor was there any evidence given in support of the right of the city to make the lease, except the testimony of one of the witnesses that the property is a part of the Old Mission, or Channel, creek land, reclaimed by the city, and that it had been always understood that it was city property.

It is contended by the appellant that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to show that the land had not been reserved by the city for public use, and that, as no such evidence was given, the plaintiff was not entitled to judgment. The reasons urged in support of this proposition are that the court should take judicial notice that the land in question is a part of the pueblo lands which were confirmed to the city of San Francisco by the decree of the circuit court of the United States, May 18,1865, and that as such confirmation was “ in trust for the benefit of all lot-holders under grants from some competent authority, and as to any residue in trust for [694]the use and benefit of the inhabitants of the city,” it is incumbent upon a claimant in ejectment against the city for any of the lands within the limits of the pueblo to show that such lands had not been granted or reserved, and that a failure to show these facts is fatal to the action, even though the evidence on behalf of the plaintiff is, in other respects, sufficient to establish his right of recovery. It would be carrying the rule of judicial notice farther than it has ever been carried to hold that the knowledge of the court includes the precise lines upon the surface of the earth which define the boundaries of a patent, or that any particular parcel of land is within or without those boundaries, or that any designated tract of land within the city and county of San Francisco is a portion of the lands which were confirmed to the city by the terms of the aforesaid decree. The boundaries of the city and county of San Francisco include a large quantity of territory that is not included within the limits of the pueblo grant; and within the limits of the pueblo grant, as confirmed by the decree, are many other tracts of land for which patents have been granted by the United States upon confirmed Mexican grants, and whose title is independent of the city and of the pueblo claim. The city has itself become the owner by purchase of different parcels of these lands, and its title thereto is in no respect conhected with the confirmation of the pueblo claim. Since the entry of the decree by the circuit court confirming this claim the United States has itself granted to the city a portion of the' lands which had been reserved by the decree for military purposes. (Act of July 1, 1870; 16 U. S. Stats. 186.) The rule contended for by the appellant would require us to hold that, in any action of ejectment against the city and county of San Francisco, the court may determine, without the introduction of any evidence, that the land in controversy is not only within the limits of the patent for the pueblo claim, but also that the city’s claim to the demanded land is de

Goodwin v. Scheerer

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