Ruggles v. Welch

California Supreme Court Mar 15, 1895 No. Nos. 15889, 15890Published

Before: Henshaw

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Holding. A special administrator has standing to appeal orders that involve the scope of their duties or potential personal liability, and while they are authorized to pay family allowances, they lack the statutory power to perform partial distributions of an estate.

Issues

Whether a special administrator has standing to appeal orders directing the disbursement of estate funds.
Whether a special administrator is authorized to pay accrued family allowances.
Whether a special administrator has the authority to perform a partial distribution of an estate.

Disposition. Affirmed in part, reversed in part.

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“Wherever an order or decree involves a construction of the proper exercise of the duties of the officer, wherever it presents a question as to the right or power of the trustee to comply with it, wherever obedience to it might subject him to liability, the rule does not operate.”

“By express contemplation of this statute the special administrator is expected to pay the family allowance”

“No express authority for decreeing partial distribution of an estate in the hands of a special administrator is found in the statute.”

Synopsis

Estate of Deceased Persons—Special Administrator—Family Allowance—Partial Distribution—Appeal.—The special administrator of the estate of a deceased person may appeal from an order directing him to pay the arrearage of family allowance which has accrued since the suspension of the general administrator, and also from a decree of partial distribution.

Id.—When Trustee may Appeal.—Wherever an order or decree involves a construction of the proper exercise of the duties of a trustee, or presents a question as to the right or power of the trustee to comply with it, or wherever obedience to it might subject him to liability, even where the order is one merely for the payment of funds, the trustee may appeal therefrom.

Id.—Family Allowance—Finding as to Necessity for.—An order for the payment of a family allowance to a widow is not invalid for lack of a specific finding that the property exempt from execution and already set apart for her support was insufficient for that purpose. The fact that the court, after setting aside exempt property, made an order for family allowance, involved of necessity the decision that the amount originally set apart was insufficient.

Id.—Claim Against Estate.—An order directing a special administrator to pay the arrearage of family allowance, which had been granted to the widow during the progress of the general administration of the estate, is not an order for the payment of a claim or debt against the estate; and the fact that the widow made application for the payment of such arrearage did not convert her statutory right into such debt or claim.

Id.—Continuance of Right to Family Allowance.—A widow’s right to the payment of a family allowance which had been granted to her while the estate was in the hands of a general administrator, is not suspended by reason of the removal of the general and the appointment of a special administrator. The right to such allowance continues during the special administration.

Id.—Delay in Demanding Allowance.—The delay of the widow for several years to demand the payment of her family allowance does not, of itself, forfeit her right to it.

Id.—Special Administrator—Partial Distribution.—A partial distribution of the estate cannot be had while it is in the hands of a special administrator.

Henshaw, J. Two separate appeals are brought to this court by the special administrator of the estate, but they may advantageously be considered and determined together.

In the first (No. 15889) the special administrator appeals from an order directing him to pay the arrearage of family allowance which has accrued since the suspension of the general administrator.

In the second (No. 15890) he appeals from a decree of partial distribution, by which he is directed to pay five thousand dollars to the widow. All of the proceedings leading to this decree were had while there was no [429]general administrator, and while appellant was in charge of the estate.

In each appeal a motion to dismiss is made upon the ground that the appellant is not a party aggrieved; and in support of the motions are cited the numerous cases which decide that an executor or administrator has in general no such interest in the conflicting claims of heirs and devisees as will warrant his appeal from adjudications fixing their rights, and distributing the estate accordingly. (Bates v. Ryberg, 40 Cal. 465; Estate of Wright, 49 Cal. 551, Estate of Marrey, 65 Cal. 287; Roach v. Coffey, 73 Cal. 282; Estate of Jessup, 80 Cal. 625; In re Sanborn, 98 Cal. 104.)

The rule as declared by these cases does not admit of question. It is a sound proposition that administrators, general or special, like receivers and other trustees or custodians of funds for designated purposes, are not ordinarily affected by orders in reference to their disposition, and, therefore, will not be. heard on appeal from such orders. But this rule has its well-defined limitations. Wherever an order or decree involves a construction of the proper exercise of the duties of the officer, wherever it presents a question as to the right or power of the trustee to comply with it, wherever obedience to it might subject him to liability, the rule does not operate. Even where the order is one merely for the payment of funds, if any of these questions arise under it and personal liability may attach, the right of the officer to appeal is recognized and upheld. (Beach on Receivers, secs. 286, 757; How v. Jones, 60 Iowa, 71; Hinckley v. Gilman etc. R. R. Co., 94 U. 8. 467; High on Receivers, sec. 8196.) The authorities above cited deal more particularly with a receiver’s right to appeal. But the principle is the same in the case of all trustees, while special administrators whose powers are here under consideration are little else than receivers in chancery, with, such limited powers as may be conferred or authorized by statute. (Schouler on Executors and Administrators, sec. 134; Croswell on Executors and Administrators, sec.

Ruggles v. Welch

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