People v. Hertz
Before: Garoutte
Synopsis
Criminal Law—Instruction—Credibility of Witnesses—Relatives of Defendant.—An instruction to the jury in a criminal case upon the credibility of witnesses for the defendant, to the effect that, in judging the credibility of such witnesses, the jury are to take into consideration the fact that they were near akin or related to the accused, and that they could not be expected to say any thing unfavorable to the defendant, is erroneous.
Id.—Credibility of Defendant—Principle Inapplicable to Relatives. An instruction to the jury bearing upon the credibility of a defendant’s testimony is not looked upon with favor by this court, and must be limited within the strictest lines; and the principle of such an instruction cannot be applied to the relatives of the defendant.
Id.—Reception of Stolen Goods—Instruction as to Value.—The value of stolen goods alleged to have been knowingly received by the defendant is a question, of fact for the jury, and is a material element of fact in the case, as bearing upon the presence of guilty knowledge in the mind of the defendant when purchasing the stolen articles; and, where various estimates of value were given by the witnesses, for the court to assume in its instruction any specific statement of value higher than the lowest estimate given by any witness is to charge the jury in respect to a matter of fact, and is violative of the constitution of the state.
Id.—Instructions—Argumentative Review of Circumstances Tending to Show Guilt.—A judge cannot be too cautious in a criminal trial in avoiding all interference with the conclusions of the jury upon the facts; and it is improper for the court to review argumentatively the circumstances tending to show the defendant’s guilt, so as to reveal the opinion of the court as to matters of fact bearing upon the question of defendant’s guilt.
Garoutte, J. Defendants were informed against by the district attorney for the crime of receiving stolen goods. Defendant Dora Hertz demanded a separate trial, which was duly accorded her, and, being found guilty, was sentenced by the court to serve a. term of four years in the state prison located at San Quentin. This appeal is taken from the final judgment and also from the order of the court denying defendant’s motion for a new trial. It is claimed by the prosecution that defendants bought and received the goods, consisting of pants, coats, and vests, of one McClellan, and that McClellan stole these articles of clothing from one Horn-burg, a tailor. At the trial McClellan himself took the stand as a witness, and stated that he was the thief, and that he sold the goods to defendants.
We think the defendant has not had a fair trial, and the judgment of conviction must be reversed upon various grounds
1. The daughters of defendant were important witnesses in her behalf, and the court gave the following [663]instruction to the .jury, bearing upon their credibility: “In judging the credibility of witnesses I know that gentlemen of your intelligence need not be told that you are to look to the witness himself or herself, observe their method of testifying, see what their motive is, if they have any in the case; in this connection you have heard the testimony of parties near akin or related to the accused woman. Now, of course, as men of common sense, you must recognize the interest that they certainly feel in the outcome of this case, and you certainly would comprehend the proposition that they would not say any thing unfavorable to her that they could well avoid saying, or properly avoid, and that they certainly would not take the trouble to volunteer any thing against her case.” This instruction is erroneous. While this court has often sustained instructions to the effect that the jury in weighing the testimony of a defendant are justified in taking into consideration his peculiar situation and relationship to the case, and the grave consequences to him depending upon the verdict of the jury, still the court has never gone to the length of holding that such an instruction wnuld be proper applied to the testimony of the relatives of the defendant. Neither have the people cited a single authority from any other state supporting such a doctrine. If the rule is to be extended beyond the defendant, and include the relatives of the defendant, there is no reason why it should not equally apply to the friends of the defendant. The result would be that the evidence offered in defendants’ behalf in many cases would be so distrusted and suspicioned as to go to the jury handicapped out of all practical usefulness. An instruction to the jury bearing upon the credibility of a defendant’s testimony is not looked upon with favor by this court. We have repeatedly frowned upon the doctrine, and said that it would be limited within the strictest lines. To now apply the principle to the relatives of a defendant would be giving it an elasticity which we cannot sanction.
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