Rea v. Wood

California Supreme Court Dec 31, 1894 No. No. 15263Published

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Holding. The court held that the defendant's alleged slanderous statements were not actionable because they did not impute a general disqualification for the plaintiff's office and did not result in any pecuniary loss or prejudice to the plaintiff.

Issues

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow the recall of a witness for further examination.
Whether the defendant's statements constituted actionable slander by imputing a general disqualification for the plaintiff's office of railroad commissioner.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“the question whether a witness may be recalled and re-examined as to matters about which he has already been examined is one left to the sound discretion of the court”

“The words spoken charge the plaintiff at most with only a single act of dishonesty, and that cannot, in our opinion, amount to an imputation of general disqualification.”

“The gist of the action was pecuniary loss, and it does not appear that the plaintiff sustained any loss or was in any way prejudiced.”

Synopsis

Evidence—Recalling Witness—Discretion.—The question whether a witness may he recalled and re-examined as to matters about which he has already been examined is one left to the sound discretion of the court, and its action will not be disturbed unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown.

Slander—Railroad Commissioner—Charge oe Single Act of Dishonesty.—A charge of a single act of dishonesty in relation to private matters against a person holding the office of railroad commissioner does not amount to an imputation of general disqualification for that office; and where the officer continued in the performance of the duties of the office without molestation until the close of his term, and was after-wards re-elected to the same office, and entered upon a second term, it cannot be said that the words spoken during the first term tended directly to injure the plaintiff in respect to his office.

Id.—Evidence—General Character.—The rule is uniform that general character cannot be proved by a single act.

Id.—Gist of Action for Slander—Direction of Verdict.—The gist of an action for slander is pecuniary loss, and where it does not appear that the plaintiff sustained any loss, or was in any way prejudiced by words spoken by the defendant which were not actionable per se, it is not error for the court to charge the jury to return a verdict for the defendant.

The Court. This is an action for slander, and the complaint contains three counts. In the second count it is alleged that the plaintiff had been a member of the state board of railroad commissioners of the state of California for more than four years, and that at the general election held in the year 1890 he was the regular nominee of the republican party for re-election to the said office of railroad commissioner, and on the fourth day of November of that year was duly re-elected to that office.

It is then alleged that on October 10, 1890, while the plaintiff was holding the said office and was such candidate for re-election, the defendant, in the county of Santa Clara, spoke to one Milo Conklin of and concerning the plaintiff these words: “ James W. Rea has robbed his father and mother in certain business transactions connected with the light and power company of the city of San Jose” ; and that in uttering said language the defendant meant and was understood to impute to plaintiff such dishonesty, untrustworthiness, and turpitude as would render him unfit to occupy the office or perform the duties of railroad commissioner.

The answer denied all the material averments of the complaint.

At the trial the plaintiff called Milo Conklin as a witness, and proved by him that in a conversation had between the witness and defendant on or about October 10, 1890, the latter said: “ Mr. Rea had robbed his father and mother out of money in this transaction between the electric light works.” And the witness further said that this statement was a portion of a general conversation which referred to Mr. Rea and his fitness for the office of railroad commissioner.

The plaintiff next called George Eustice as a witness, and asked him to state certain conversations relating to Mr. Rea which he had with the defendant in July, 1890, and again after the commencement of this action, but on objection of defendant the answers were excluded.

The plaintiff then recalled Milo Conklin as a witness, [319]and asked him to “ state the whole of the conversation had between Mr. Rea and yourself upon the 10th of October, so far as it related to the qualifications óf Mr. Rea for the office of railroad commissioner.”

The defendant objected to the question upon the ground that the witness had already been examined upon the same matter, and the court sustained the objection, the plaintiff reserving an exception.

Rea v. Wood

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