People v. Daniels

California Supreme Court Dec 26, 1894 No. No. 21010Published

Before: Haynes

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Holding. The court held that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in admitting evidence of a conspiracy and that the court's refusal to direct an acquittal was correct because the Penal Code only authorizes the court to advise an acquittal.

Issues

Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a conspiracy before the conspiracy was fully established.
Whether a witness may testify to a partial conversation heard.
Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury to acquit the defendants at the close of the prosecution's evidence.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“It is largely in the discretion of the court as to how much evidence of the existence of the conspiracy shall be required before receiving evidence of the acts and declarations of one of the alleged conspirators”

“The court was only authorized in any case to “advise” the jury to acquit.”

“The obvious effect of this provision of the Penal Code is to take from the court the power to determine, as a matter of law, at the close of the evidence for the prosecution, that the evidence is insufficient to justify a conviction.”

Synopsis

Criminal Law—Order Denying New Trial—Dismissal of Appeal.—An appeal from an order denying a new trial in a criminal case must be dismissed if taken after the time limited therefor by section 1239 of the Penal Code.

Id.—Admission of Immaterial Evidence.—The admission of immaterial evidence in a criminal case, which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties, is not ground for the reversal of a judgment of conviction.

Id.—Conspiracy to Maintain Action for Slander—Overt Act—Evidence— Commencement of Suit.—In a criminal prosecution for conspiring falsely to move and maintain an action of slander, under division 3 of section 182 of the Penal Code, it is necessary to allege and to prove, in addition to the conspiracy, some overt act in furtherance and pursuance of the conspiracy, and the complaint in the action of slander is properly received in evidence for the purpose of proving the commencement of the action by filing of the complaint as an overt act.

Id.—Evidence—Declarations of Conspirator—Order of Evidence— Discretion.—In a criminal prosecution for a conspiracy it is not necessary that the conspiracy be actually shown to have been formed before the declarations of either of the conspirators can be proven; though, if the conspiracy is not ultimately proven, such declarations must be disregarded; and the order of proof is largely in the discretion of the court, which may determine how much evidence of the existence of the conspiracy should be required before receiving evidence of the acts and declarations of one of the alleged conspirators in the absence of the other; and, where evidence has been given tending to prove a conspiracy, objection made to the evidenced a conversation with one of the defendants relating to the suit after its commencement, upon the ground that no conspiracy had then been established, is properly overruled.

Id.—Proof of Part of Conversation.—Where a part only of a conversation is heard by a witness, the rule that he must give all that was said applies only to so much as he heard, and if what he heard is intelligible and pertinent to the case, the prosecution is entitled to prove it; and, if the part not heard by the witness would in any material respect modify or explain the part heard, the defendant may give it in explanation. Id.—Taking Case from Jury—Power of Court.—Under section 1118 of the Penal Code the court cannot instruct the jury to acquit the defendant for want of sufficient evidence, but is only authorized in any case to advise the jury to acquit, which advice the jury are not bound to follow, and the court in a criminal case has no power to determine as matter of law, at the close of the evidence of the prosecution, that the evidence is insufficient to justify a conviction.

Id.—Instructions—False Conspiracy.—Where an instruction for the prosecution closely follows the statute, and does not omit the word “ falsely,” and the instructions for the defendants give them the benefit of any reasonable doubt as to whether they conspired together willfully, corruptly, falsely, and fraudulently to prosecute the action by unlawful means, or by false and fraudulent testimony corruptly procured, the defendants cannot complain that the jury was misdirected upon the subject of falsely moving or maintaining the action.

Haynes, C. Appellants were indicted for conspiring falsely to move and maintain an action of slander by Zua Daniels against M. J. Church, under division 3 of section 182 of the Penal Code, and upon the trial were found guilty by the jury, and a judgment against each was entered, imposing a fine; and they appeal from said judgments and an order denying their motion for a new trial.

The appeal from the order denying a new trial must be dismissed, because taken long after the time limited therefor by section 1239 of the Penal Code.

Appellants’ brief, however, is almost wholly devoted to questions which could only be considered upon an appeal from such order, and point out no errors in receiving or rejecting evidence, unless it is contained in the statement that, “ The whole of the evidence for [264]the prosecution is irrelevant, immaterial, and inadmissible for any purpose, for the reason that it did not even tend to show that Daniels and Hutchings had conspired together to falsely move or maintain the action of Zua Daniels v. M. J. ChurchThe bill of exceptions covers nearly four hundred pages of the transcript, and clearly it was the duty of counsel if, in their opinion, any material error was committed, to have pointed it out and shown how or why appellants were prejudiced by it. That the evidence took an exceedingly wide range, and that much of it was immaterial is apparent, but we cannot on that ground alone reverse the judgment. The Penal Code, section 1258, provides: “After hearing the appeal the court must give judgment without regard to technical errors or defects, or to exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.”

The exceptions which seem to us to be most important will be briefly noticed. The complaint in the action of Zua Daniels against M. J. Church was properly received in evidence. To sustain this prosecution it was necessary to allege in the indictment and to prove upon the trial, in addition to the conspiracy, some overt act in furtherance or pursuance of the conspiracy. The commencement of the action by filing the complaint was an overt act (Pen. Code, sec. 184), though such overt act need not be alleged or proved if the conspiracy was to commit a felony.

Objection was made to evidence of a conversation between Church and defendant Hutchings relating to the suit after its commencement upon the ground that no conspiracy had then been established. Evidence had been given tending to prove a conspiracy, but it was not necessary that the conspiracy be actually shown to have been formed before the declarations of either of the conspirators can be proven. If the conspiracy is not ultimately proved, such declarations must be disregarded; but generally conspiracies cannot be proved as an independent fact, such as the execution of a promissory note, but are shown from circumstances, some testi

People v. Daniels

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