Irvine v. Tarbat
Before: Searls
Synopsis
Ejectment—Statute of Limitations—Patent of United States.—Where the plaintiff, in an action of ejectment, claims under a valid patent of the United States, issued within six months prior to the commencement of the action, a plea of the statute of limitations cannot prevail.
Id.—Conclusiveness of Patent—Authority of Land-office—Questions of Pact—Townsite—Place of Trade or Business.—A patent of the United States for land, which the land department has, under the statute, authority to convey, depending upon the existence of particular facts which it is the duty of the laud department to ascertain, is conclusive of the existence of the authority, upon collateral attack, and when the patent is issued upon a pre-emption or homestead claim, it is conclusive evidence that the land in question was open to pre-emption and homestead, and that there was no townsite thereon, or settlement for trade or business, these being questions of fact which the land department has the right to determine preliminary to granting a patent for the land.
Id.—Evidence—Proceedings in Land-office.—The proceedings in the land department are not admissible, in an action of ejectment, for the purpose of assailing the patent upon which the plaintiff relies for recovery.
Searls, C. This is what would formerly have been termed an action of ejectment to recovera small tract of land, parcel of one hundred and forty-three and twenty-three one-hundredths acres patented to the plaintiff October 13, 1890, by the government of the United States, situate at or near Carson Hill, county of Calaveras, state of California.
The defense set up was that the locus in quo was and is a part of the townsite of Carson Hill, and as such was not subject to patent by plaintiff.
The statute of limitations was also pleaded in bar of the action, but as such action was instituted April 13, 1891, within six months next after the issuance of patent, the plea cannot prevail, if plaintiff’s patent was valid to convey title.
Plaintiff had judgment, from which and from an order denying her motion for a new trial defendant appeals.
Plaintiff introduced his patent to the land, proved that the land in dispute was included therein, and rested.
[241]Defendant, among other testimony introduced for the purpose of proving a townsite, offered in evidence, and, against the objection of plaintiff was permitted to introduce, the proceedings had in the United States land-office, from which it appeared that in September, 1879, plaintiff Irvine settled upon the land which had been surveyed in 1871.
On May 22, 1883, he made homestead entry of said land, and in December, 1885, he made final proof.
Against the allowance of the final entry, sundry parties, among vfhom was appellant, protested upon various grounds, among which were “ that the townsite of Carson is situate on portions of the lands last aforesaid.”
Thereupon and thereafter such proceedings were had in the case that, upon an appeal from the local land-office to the commissioner of the general land-office, it was held, among other things, “ that the claim of a town-site is not supported by the facts in the case,” and reversing the finding of the local land-officer that “ Carson was a valid and legal townsite,” which decision was, on an appeal, affirmed by the secretary of the interior department.
Respondent was thereupon permitted to make0 final proofs,"and the patent in evidence issued to him. There was no showing that Carson was ever an incorporated town or village. .
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