People v. Eppinger
Before: Harrison
Synopsis
Criminal Law—Forgery—Making of Fictitious Instrument—Improper Designation of Offense.—An information charging a defendant with forgery in making and forging a fictitious instrument purporting to be the check of a person who has no existence, with-intent to defraud, improperly designates the offense as forgery; but where the information specifies acts constituting the offense, under section 476 of the Penal Code, of making or passing a fictitious instrument in writing, and is sufficiently clear to show that the prosecution is under that section, the additional designation of the offense as “ forgery” is imma. terial.
Id.—Forgery a Statutory Offense—Fictitious Check—Distinct Offense.—Forgery is a statutory offense, and the charge of that offense against the accused must be found within the terms of the statute; and though by the criminal law of England the making of a fictitious check would be punishable as a forgery, that offense is a distinct offense with a distinctly designated punishment, under section 476 of the Penal Code.
Id.—Pleading—Sufficiency of Information—Presumption of Innocence.—An information must contain that which shows on its face that' a crime has been committed by the accused, and if the matters charged , in it are as consistent with the innocence of the accused as with his guilt, the presumption of his innocence will overcome the accusation of guilt, and the accused is not to be subjected to a trial of the charge.
Id.—Character of Fictitious Signature—Copartnership Name—Insufficient Information.—Under section 476 of the Penal Code the essence of the offense is the making, with an intent to defraud another, of an obligation of some “bank, corporation, copartnership, or individual,” when in fact there is no such obligor in existence, and the information must state which class of obligors specified in the statute is claimed to have been assumed by the defendant; and an information setting out a fictitious check apparently signed by a copartnership name, and merely alleging that there is no individual of that name in existence, is insufficient.
Id.—Ambiguous' Signature—Name oe Firm or Corporation—Necessary Averments.—Where the signature to the check may be either that of a copartnership or of a corporation it must he alleged in the information that there was no copartnership in existence by that name, and that there was no corporation in existence by that name.
Id.—Evidence—City Directory—Existence op Firm.—A city directory showing therefrom that the name signed to the check does not appear therein is competent for the purpose of proving that there is no firm of the name appended to the signature.
Id.—Testimony op Police Oppicer.—It is competent to prove by the testimony of a police officer that he has made inquiries for such a firm, without success.
Harrison, J. An information was filed in the superior court of the city and county of San Francisco [38]against the defendant, charging him with “ forgery," committed as follows: “The said W. L. Eppinger, on the thirteenth day of November, a. d. eighteen hundred and ninety-three, at the said city- and county of San Francisco, state of California, with intent to defraud, did make and forge a certain fictitious instrument in writing for the payment of money, purporting to be signed by M. Howell & Co., and which said instrument in writing was and is in the words and figures following, to wit:
“No. 48 Clearing House, No. 2.
“ San Francisco, Nov. 13, 1893.
“ The Bank of British Columbia, San Francisco, Cal. Pay to W. L. Eppinger or bearer $36.00. Thirty-six ^ dollars. M. Howell & Co.
“And on the back thereof was indorsed the name ‘ W. L. Eppinger.’ ”
Whereas, in truth and in fact there was no such individual as M. Howell & Co. in existence, as he, the said W. L. Eppinger, then and there well knew, and'that the said instrument in writing was fictitious; and upon the trial thereof he was convicted and sentenced to the state prison for the term of fourteen years.
Section 476 of the Penal Code of this state makes special provision for the offense of making or passing a fictitious instrument in writing, and a distinction is thus made between the forgery of a check upon an existing person and the making and passing of a fictitious instrument purporting to be the check of a person who has no existence. In People v. Elliott, 90 Cal. 586, it was held that section 470 of the Penal Code does not include the matters contained in section 476, and that the act of making or passing a fictitious check can only be prosecuted when brought within the requirements and conditions of the latter section.
As the specific acts constituting the offense with which the defendant is charged are set forth in the information with sufficient clearness to show that the [39]prosecution is under this section, the additional designation of the offense as “ forgery” is immaterial. Forgery is a statutory offense, and the charge against the accused must be found within the terms of the statute. While by the criminal law of England the making of a fictitious check would be punishable as a forgery, the provisions of section 476 of the Penal Code show that it was the intention of the legislature of this state to render the making or passing of a fictitious instrument a distinct offense with a designated punishment, and the prosecution in the present case is accordingly had under that section.
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