Feliz v. Feliz
Before: Harrison
Synopsis
Adverse Possession—Tenancy in Common—Notice—Prescription.— When a tenant in common is in possession of the whole premises, and exercises acts of ownership of an unequivocal character, overt and notorious, and of such a nature as by their own import to impart information and notice to the other cotenants that an adverse possession and disseisin are intended, his possession is adverse, and if continued for five years, with payment of all taxes levied and assessed on the land after April 1, 1878, will vest a title by prescription.
Id.—Instructions — Construction op Charge to Jury.—Instructions upon the subject of adverse possession by a tenant in common are to be taken together and considered as a whole; and if, when so considered, the law as to adverse holding between such tenants is correctly stated, the fact that one of the instructions taken by itself is not complete upon that subject will not vitiate the charge to the jury, but the jury will be deemed to have properly applied the law as stated by the charge taken as a whole.
Id.—Residence of Cotenant in Family of Adverse Possessor.—The fact that a nephew of the adverse possessor, who is also a cotenant, continues to reside thereon as a member of the family of the cotenant, who is in adverse possession, does not prevent the possession of the latter from being adverse, but the undisputed hostile acts of adverse possession by him would be more readily brought to the notice of the co-tenant residing in his family, and afford him an opportunity of asserting his claim in opposition thereto.
Id.—Directing Jury as to Form of Verdict—Limitation of Recovery not Asked for.—The court has the right to instruct the jury as to the form of their verdict, and when no question is made in the answer or at the trial as to the right of plaintiffs to recover the whole premises, if entitled to recover at all, the defendants cannot, after an adverse verdict, insist that there should have been a limitation in the instructions as to the right of recovery of plaintiffs with respect to which the defendants did not ask for any instructions.
Id.—Evidence—Statements from Assessor’s Office.—Statements from the assessor’s office not signed by the party against whom they are offered, nor shown to have been made under his direction, or with his knowledge, are not competent evidence against him or parties claiming under him.
Id.—Estates of Deceased Persons—Prescriptive Title of Heir—Subsequent Inventory and Appraisement—Petition for Homestead.— An inventory and appraisement of the estate of the deceased ancestor, and a petition by the widow for a homestead, made and filed after one of the heirs has acquired a title by prescription as against all other heirs, can have no effect in determining whether the possession of the land of the decedent by such heirs was adverse from the time of the death of the ancestor.
Harrison, J. The plaintiffs recovered judgment against the defendants for possession of certain lands in the city of Santa Cruz, and a motion for a new trial having been made by the defendants, was granted by the court “ upon the sole ground ” that the court erred in giving certain instructions to the jury. From this order the plaintiffs have appealed.
The lands in controversy are included in the tract granted by Congress to the town of Santa Cruz July 23, 1886, and were conveyed by the town to Juan Jose Feliz, March 4, 1867. Juan Jose Feliz died intestate in June, 1871, leaving several heirs at law, but administration [4]upon his estate was not had until April, 1885, when the defendant, Frank Feliz, was appointed administrator. Miguel Feliz, one of the sons of Juan Jose Feliz, lived for many years on a portion of the premises in controversy, claiming them as his own, and, after his father’s death, went into occupancy and possession of the entire tract of land in controversy, and held possession of the same until July, 1885, when he was ejected therefrom by the defendants. The plaintiffs are children of Miguel, and their title to the premises is derived by means of conveyances from him. September 19, 1874, the widow of Juan Jose Feliz, who, after the death of her husband, continued to reside on the premises with her son Miguel, made a conveyance of the entire tract to him, and thereafter continued to reside with him as a member of his family until he was dispossessed thereof by the defendants. Miguel also received conveyances of the premises from others of the heirs of his father, but not from all of them.
The court gave to the jury the following instructions:
“1. The jury are instructed that, when a cotenant enters and exercises acts of ownership upon lands in which he has a cotenant, the intent with which such acts are performed must in all cases determine whether or not they amount to an ouster, and when a tenant in common is in possession and exercises acts of ownership of an unequivocal character, overt and notorious, and of such a nature as by their own import to impart information, and give notice to the other cotenants that an adverse possession and a disseisin are intended to be asserted against them, then the possession of such tenant in common is adverse; and if such a possession is actual, adverse, open, notorious, and exclusive, and continuing for the period of five years, it extinguishes the right of the party having the true title, and vests a perfect title in the adverse holder, provided that such possession existed for five continuous years before the first day of April, 1878; but if such possession did not exist for five continuous years before the first day of April, 1878, then
More from California Supreme Court
- People v. Wende (1979)
- People v. Watson (1956)
- People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996)
- People v. Kelly (2006)
- Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962)
- Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
- People v. Lewis (2021)
- In Re Estrada (1965)
- Denham v. Superior Court (1970)
- People v. Marsden (1970)