Knox v. Moses

Garoutte, J. This is an action of ejectment, and as a defense it is claimed that the realty involved is the separate property of respondent,, Julia A. Bray.

Her title rests upon the validity of a deed given to her by Watson A. Bray, her husband and corespondent, August 3, 1881. It is here claimed that this transfer of the realty was void, upon the ground that it was made with intent to defraud Watson A. Bray’s creditors, and the determination of the court as to the validity of this deed points the judgment in the case. The trial court by its findings of fact declared in favor of the deed, and those findings of fact are now assailed as unsupported by the evidence.

This action was tried and submitted upon testimony taken in two other cases, and it is now insisted that for such reason this court should take a first and original view of the evidence introduced, and weigh and measure it by the same standard and test that the trial court was required to apply. In other words, it is contended that the evidence should be examined and gauged the same as though the question here presented arose by an original proceeding pending in this court. This position of appellant is unsound. The court has declared the .rule contrary to the principle sought to be invoked. (Reay [505]v. Butler, 95 Cal. 215; Brown v. Campbell, 100 Cal. 635; 38 Am. St. Rep. 314.)

The question still remains, Is there a substantial conflict in the evidence as to whether or not W. A. Bray made this conveyance to his wife with intent to defraud his creditors? Appellant’s counsel say: “Assuming, then, that Bray was insolvent and the deed was a gift, the question arises, Doe,s not the law pronounce the gift fraudulent and void even as against Bray’s denial of a fraudulent intent? We say it does, notwithstanding the provisions of the code that the fraudulent intent is a question of fact.” It was held in Bull v. Bray, 89 Cal. 286, in language plain and positive, that in this state there are no conditions under which the law will or can pronounce a gift void, as having been made with intent to defraud creditors. Courts and juries may so declare as matter of fact, but it cannot be so declared as a matter of law. It is further stated in appellant’s brief that the case of Bull v. Bray, “simply decides a question of practice in regard to findings.” It is evident that the scope and effect of that decision is entirely misunderstood by counsel, for a most important principle of law is laid down in that decision; a principle which will certainly maintain in this state as long as the present legislation upon this question remains upon the statute books. Threlkel v. Scott (Cal., Nov. 25, 1893), 34 Pac. Rep. 851, does not limit the effect of the principles declared in Bull v. Bray, and in no way militates against any thing there decided.