Tuttle v. Block

California Supreme Court Nov 1, 1894 No. No. 15544Published

Before: Belcher, Fitzgerald, Haven, McFarland, Temple, Vancliee

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Holding. The court held that a statute imposing a reasonable time limitation on the enforcement of a matured contractual obligation, such as the right to a tax deed, does not unconstitutionally impair the obligation of the contract.

Issues

Whether section 3788 of the Political Code, which limits the time to obtain a tax deed, unconstitutionally impairs the obligation of a contract of sale.
Whether a reasonable statutory limitation on the time to enforce a matured contractual obligation violates the constitutional prohibition against impairing the obligation of contracts.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“It is well settled that a reasonable limitation of the time within which a matured contractual, obligation maybe enforced by suit does not impair the obligation of the contract in the sense of the constitutional prohibition cited”

“The amendment in question is clearly a prospective statute of limitation of the time within which the tax deed must have been made, and consequently a like limitation of the time within which an action must have been commenced”

Synopsis

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

The purchase at a tax sale is a contract, made under the law as it then exists, and upon the terms prescribed by law, and no subsequent statute can import new terms into it, or add to those before expressed. (Cooley on Taxation, 2d ed., 545; Robinson v. Howe, 13 Wis. 341; Dikeman v. Dikeman, 11 Paige, 484; Merrill v. Dearring, 32 Minn. 479; Wolfe v. Henderson, 28 Ark. 304; Cargill v. Power, 1 Mich. 369; Forqueran v. Donnally, 7 W. Va. 114; Sutton v. Stone, 4 Neb. 319.) Laws relating to the validity, construction, discharge, and enforcement are part of the contract. (Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595-601; Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535-50; Mc-Cracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608; Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311-19.) The obligation consists in the binding force on the party who makes the contract, and that depends on the laws in existence at the time when it is made. (Sturges v. Crowninshield, - 4 Wheat. 122-97; Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595-601; McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608; Robinson v. Magee, 9 Cal. 84; 70 Am. Dec. 638.) The obligation of a contract com-menees at its date, and continues until the act contracted to be done has been performed. (Blair v. Williams, 4 Litt. 34; Forsyth v. Marbury, R. M. Charlt. 324.) Whatever substantially defeats the end contemplated, impairs the obligation of the contract. (Robinson v. Magee, 9 Cal. 81; 70 Am. Dec. 638; Townsend v. Townsend, Peck, 1; 14 Am. Dec. 722; Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595.) As the law enters into .the contract and forms a part of it the obligation of such a contract must depend upon the law existing at the time the contract is made. The contract then being complete and operative, the legislature cannot, by a subsequent act, impair its obligation. (Robinson v. Magee, 9 Cal. 81; 70 Am. Dec. 638. See, also, People v. Bond, 10 Cal. 563-72; People v. Broohs, 16 Cal. 10, 32, 33; Montgomery v. Casson, 16 Cal. 189-94; Rose v. Estudillo, 39 Cal. 270-74; English v. Sacramento, 19 Cal. 172-84; Stafford v. LicTc, 7 Cal. 479.) An act which takes from a party that which before was his is unconstitutional.' (Rich v. Maples, 33 Cal. 102-10.) Retrospective statutes impairing vested rights are unconstitutional. (Jackson v. Lyon, 9 Cow. 664-69; Proprietors etc. v. Laboree, 2 Me. 275; 11 Am. Dec. 79.) The right of a purchaser to a tax sale deed cannot be taken away by subsequent legislation. (Bruce v. Schuyler, 9 Ill. 221, 269, 274, 281; 46 Am. Dec. 447.) It is not competent for the legislature to pass an act impairing the obligation of a contract, nor can it deprive a citizen of his property or other vested right by mere legislative act. (Dobbins v. First Nat. Bank, 112 Ill. 553-66; People v. Board of State Auditor, 9 Mich. 327.) The legislature has no power to divest titles or legal or equitable rights previously vested, or to vest them in another. (Helm v. Webster, 85 Ill. 116; Brown v. Morison, 5 Ark. 217-21; Grissom v. Hill, 17 Ark. 489; Koenig v. Omaha etc. R. R. Co., 3 Neb. 373; Dewey v. Lambier, 7 Cal. 347; Stafford v. Lick, 7 Cal. 479.) To extend the time for redemption is to alter the substance of the contract, as much as would be the extension of the time for payment of a oromis-gory note, and therefore the law is unconstitutional. (Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, 5th ed., 354.)

Vancliee, C. On the petition of plaintiff an alternative writ of mandate was issued to defendant in .his official character as tax collector of the city and county of San Francisco, commanding him to execute to plaintiff a deed of a certain lot of land which had been sold by defendant’s predecessor in office to plaintiff’s assignor for delinquent taxes, or to show cause why he had not done so.

The court sustained defendant’s demurrer to the petition on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to entitle plaintiff to the writ, and thereupon dismissed the proceeding. From this judgment the plaintiff appeals.

The petition and affidavit of plaintiff show that the lot in question was on March 31, 1875, regularly sold to William Bosworth for delinquent taxes theretofore properly assessed to W. W. Lapham as owner, and that a certificate of such sale in due form was then issued by the tax collector to Bosworth; that the lot has never been redeemed from said sale; that after the time for such redemption had expired, to wit, December 1, 1875, Bosworth assigned the certificate of sale, with all his rights incidental thereto, to the plaintiff; that plaintiff thereupon entered into possession of the lot, and has ever since had sole possession thereof, and that the same has ever since been assessed to him for taxes, all of which taxes he has paid; that on March 20,1893, the petitioner presented said certificate of purchase to defendant, and demanded that he, as tax collector, etc., officially execute to petitioner a deed for said lot, and, at the same time, tendered to defendant three dollars as and for his lawful fee for making such deed; hut that defendant then refused, and ever since has refused, to execute such deed.

The specific and only ground upon which the demurrer was sustained is that the petition shows that petitioner’s right to the writ is barred by section 3788 of the Political Code as amended February 13, 1885, which, among other things, provides: “In all cases where land has [448]been heretofore sold for delinquent taxes the deed therefor must be made within one year and three months after this act takes effect, and, unless so made, the purchaser shall be deemed to have relinquished all his rights under such sale.”

Neither at the time of the tax sale to Bosworth, nor at any time prior to the enactment of this amendment (February 15, 1885) of section 3788 of the Political Code, was there any statutory limitation upon the time within which the deed must have been made by the tax collector, except that it could not have been made until after the expiration of the period allowed for redemption, which period expired in this case in 1875, more than nine years before the passage of the amendment.

Tuttle v. Block

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