Hunt v. Broderick

McFarland, J. This is an appeal by defendant from a judgment of the superior court in a mandamus proceeding, by which the defendant as auditor was required to audit, allow, etc., a certain claim and demand of plaintiff against the city and county of San Francisco which had been duly passed and allowed by the board of supervisors of said city and county. The appeal is upon the judgment-roll and a bill of exceptions. We see no good reason for disturbing the judgment of the court below.

There is no doubt from the evidence that the demand of respondent’s intestate, Sharp, was a just one. The defenses and the points made here for reversal are in their nature technical — that is, they are based upon alleged irregularities committed by said Sharp, deceased, in presenting his demand and in prosecuting the appeal, and upon certain statutory provisions claimed to be obstructions which shut out his right of recovery.

I. Appellant objects to the form of demand, because it does not so specify the items thereof as to sufficiently comply with section 84 of the Consolidation Act. The demand was for legal services rendered by Sharp as an attorney in a protracted litigation, which resulted in the recovery by the city of valuable real property, viz: City slip, lot number 43. In his original petition to the board, Sharp, in reciting the history of his services, mentioned certain disbursements which in the course of the litigation he had paid out of his own pocket; and if these are to be considered part of the demand finally allowed by the board they were, perhaps, not sufficiently itemized. But we think the court was justified by the evidence in finding “ that the said demand was and is for counsel fees alone, and was so treated and regarded, and as such allowed and approved by both the judiciary [315]committee and the finance committee of the said board of supervisors, and as such was ordered paid by said board of supervisors, and as such allowed and approved by the mayor of said city and county, the ex officio president of said board, as such demand for counsel fees.” And there was certainly a sufficient specification of the counsel fees.

2. Where the hoard of supervisors have not exceeded their powers in allowing a demand, and the latter is a valid and legal claim against the county, it is the duty of the auditor to audit it, and mandamus will lie to compel him to do so. (San Francisco Gas Co. v. Dunn, 62 Cal. 589; Wood v. Strother, 76 Cal. 545; 9 Am. St. Rep. 249, and cases there cited; Sweeny v. Maynard, 52 Cal. 468; Stockton etc. R. R. Co. v. Stockton, 51 Cal. 328; Babcock v. Goodrich, 47 Cal. 488; Enkle v. Edgar, 63 Cal. 188.)