Robinson v. Thornton

California Supreme Court Aug 31, 1893 No. No. 14819Published

Before: Garoutte, Harrison

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Holding. A grantee of a judgment debtor is not estopped from denying the grantor's title and may hold land adversely to the grantor and the world, including a subsequent purchaser at an execution sale. Because the judgment debtor's interest was extinguished by a prior foreclosure sale, the subsequent attachment and execution sale conveyed no title, and the grantee's adverse possession ripened into a prescriptive title.

Issues

Whether a grantee of a judgment debtor is estopped from disputing the grantor's title in an ejectment action brought by a purchaser at an execution sale.
Whether a purchaser at an execution sale can recover in ejectment against a grantee of the judgment debtor when the debtor's interest was extinguished by a prior foreclosure sale.
Whether the statute of limitations for adverse possession begins to run against a purchaser at an execution sale prior to the issuance of the sheriff's deed.

Disposition. reversed as to the appellant Thornton, and affirmed as to the appellant Hannah Green.

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“The grantee does not, by his entry, assume any obligation towards his grantor, nor is there any relation of trust or confidence between them, which is forfeited by his repudiation of the title under which he entered”

“The rights of the grantor are extinguished by the sale, and as the property has thereby become the property of the grantee, he holds it with all the attributes of ownership”

“At the date of the sale in 1881 Thornton had acquired a title by prescription which gave him the right to the possession of the land (Civ. Code, sec. 1007), superior to any claim of the plaintiff”

Synopsis

Foreclosure oe Mortgage—Sheriee’s Deed—Relation.—A sheriff’s deed executed to the purchaser at a sale under a judgment foreclosing a mortgage vests the purchaser with all the title to the land that the mortgagors had at the date of the mortgage, or which they had subsequently acquired therein.

Id—Attachment Prior to Deed.—An attachment upon the property of the mortgagors affects only the interest in the land which was then held by them, and if the land has been sold by the sheriff under foreclosure sale, the deed subsequently executed by the sheriff extinguishes the interest which the mortgagors had at the date of the attachment.

Id.—Extinguishment oe Judgment Lien.—A judgment rendered after the date of the sale under foreclosure of a mortgage cannot be a lien upon the property of the mortgagors, and the land is not subject to a sale in satisfaction of the judgment.

Id.—Conveyance by Mortgagor—Adverse Possession—Prescriptive Title.—The conveyance by the mortgagor after sale of the land under foreclosure, and the execution of the sheriff’s deed, does not transfer any title or interest in the land; but if the purchaser takes possession of the land, and maintains an adverse possession thereof for the full period of the statute of limitations, he becomes vested with a prescriptive title thereto.

Id.—Estoppel — Aetb r-acquired Title—Ejectment.—A judgment debtor in possession of property at the time of the sale, or any one claiming under him subsequently to the creation of a judgment or attachment lien, who has no other title than that which he derived from the judgment debtor, and which was sold under the execution, cannot defeat • the right of the purchaser at the sale to recover the land in ejectment by showing that he had no title to the land, or that the true title was outstanding; but the sheriff’s deed does not transfer any after-acquired interest in the land, and the judgment debtor or his vendee may show that he has acquired a different title frcm that which was sold under the judgment, and his vendee may also show that the judgment debtor himself had no interest in the land at the time of the sale.

Id. —Vendee oe Land Not Estopped.—The vendee or grantee of land is not estopped from disputing the validity of the title under which he entered, and he may show another and independent title in himself.

Id.—Adverse Possession oe Grantee—Prescription.—The possession of a grantee becomes adverse to his grantor immediately upon his entry under the grant, and by this adverse possession he may acquire a title by prescription which will be as available for the protection of his possession as one acquired by grant.

Id.—Running oe Statute oe Limitations—Sheriff’s Deed—Title oe Stranger. —The rule that the statute of limitations does not begin to run against the judgment debtor, or one claiming under him, until the execution of the sheriff’s deed, has no application to a stranger to the judgment, or to any title which is not received from the judgment debtor.

Opinion — Harrison

Harrison, J. Ejectment for land in San Mateo county. A certificate of purchase for the lands involved herein was issued to Benjamin S. Green by the register and receiver of the land office of the United States, March 5, 1863, and a patent therefor was issued to him August 1, 1871. April 21, 1869, Green and wife mortgaged the land to C. C. Wilson and J. P. Jourdan, and in an action for the foreclosure of this mortgage, commenced September 6, 1870, a judgment ivas rendered, under which the land was sold January 2, 1872, and on the same day the sheriff’s certificate therefor filed in the office of the county recorder. July 3, 1872, the sheriff executed his deed to the purchaser, who, on the twenty-sixth day of September, 1872, conveyed his interest in the land to William Ford.

April 1, 1872, John McCombe commenced an action in the fifteenth district court in and for the city and county of San Francisco, against Green and wife, and a writ of attachment was issued therein, under which the sheriff of San Mateo county, on the next day, purported to levy upon all the right, title, and interest of Green and wife in the land. Judgment was rendered in this action in favor of plaintiff, November 5, 1880, and by virtue of an execution issued thereon the sheriff, on December 10, 1881, sold the land to Alexander Forbes. June 4, 1887, the sheriff who made the sale executed a deed for the land, and on June S, 1887, the sheriff then in office executed another deed therefor. The plaintiff claims title by virtue of these deeds, and on the eighth day of June, 1887, commenced the present action.

August 17, 1872, B. S. Green executed a conveyance of the land to the appellant, Thornton, who, on the next day entered into the possession thereof, and has since remained in adverse possession, and paid all the taxes levied thereon from the year 1872 until the time of trial. [680]The plaintiff had judgment in the court below, from which, and an order denying a new trial, the defendant has appealed.

Whether there was sufficient evidence before the court to authorize it to find that the sheriff made an effective levy on the land by virtue of the writ of attachment issued in the action of McCombe v. Green need not be determined; but assuming that such levy was made, it affected only the interest in the land which was then held by the defendants in the attachment. Prior to that date their interest in the land had been sold under the judgment in foreclosure against them, and the'deed which was subsequently executed to the purchaser at that sale vested him with all the title to the land that the Greens had on the twenty-first day of April, 1869 (the date of the mortgage), or which they had subsequently acquired therein (Sichler v. Look, 93 Cal. 610), and the interest or estate which the Greens had at the date of the attachment was thereby extinguished. The execution of the deed gave to the purchaser at the sale no new title to the land purchased by him, but was merely evidence that his title had become absolute. Upon the sale he acquired “all the right, title, interest, and claim of the judgment debtors thereto” (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 700), subject to be defeated by a redemption within six months, and to the right of the judgment debtors to remain in the possession of the land until the execution of the sheriff’s deed, and all that remained in the Greens was this right of redemption, and to retain possession of the land until the expiration of the time therefor. “ During the period which elapses between the sale and the expiration of the time for redemption the statute regards the purchaser as the owner, in equity, and gives him the rents and profits, or the value of the use and occupation. In short, it gives him the entire beneficial interest in the property, except the actual possession.” (Page v. Rogers, 31 Cal. 302.)

Robinson v. Thornton

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Synopsis

Opinion — Harrison

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