In re Pearson
Before: McFarland
Synopsis
Vendor and Purchaser—Tender of Purchase Monet—Objection Not Expressed. —The sufficiency of a tender of the unpaid balance of the purchase price of land cannot be objected to on the ground that it was not in gold coin, where the only objection made to the tender at the time it was made was that it did not include interest and taxes.
Id.—Estates of Deceased Persons—Sale bt Executor—Appeal From Decree of Confirmation—Stipulation Suspending Contract Rights —Interest on Purchase Monet—Taxes.—Where an executor under a power of sale contained in the will sold the property of the decedent at auction, part of the purchase money to be paid in cash and the balance on confirmation of title by the superior court, and the purchasers appealed from the decree of confirmation, whereupon it was stipulated between them and the executor that the whole matter should remain in statu quo until after the decision of the supreme court establishing the rights of the purchasers, the stipulation suspended the consummation of the contract until after the determination of the appeal, and the purchasers are not liable for interest upon the purchase money from the date of the auction sale, nor for taxes, but they may compel a conveyance to themselves upon their payment of the balance of the purchase money.
Id.—Sale by Executor Under Power Not Judicial.—An executor’s sale of realty under a power in a will is not strictly a judicial sale; but as between the executor and purchaser the dealings are the same as they would be between any other vendor and vendee.
McFarland, J. This is an appeal of E. J. Moore, executor of the will of Hiram A. Pearsons, deceased, from an order of the court below requiring him to complete the sales of several pieces of real property made by him to John F. English and others, respondents herein, and confirmed by the court March 18,1892, and to execute to them deeds of conveyance of said property upon their payment of the balance of the purchase money.
On January 28, 1892, the appellant, as executor, sold the said property at auction to the respondents, under a power of sale contained in the will of said Pearsons, deceased. The terms of the sale were cash in gold coin, ten per cent to the auctioneer at the time of sale, and balance on confirmation of sale by the superior court. When the matter of confirming the sale came up before the court on March 18, 1892, the respondents herein objected to the confirmation on the ground that under the will the executor had no power to sell the property without a previous order of the court; but the court made an order confirming the sale. Thereafter, on April 18, 1892, appellant tendered to each of the respondents a deed of the property sold to him, and demanded payment of the balance of the purchase money, which amounted to thirty-three thousand three hundred and forty-five dollars, and notified them that on default of immediate payment thereof “such recourse will be taken as is afforded by law.” Payment not having been made, the appellant, on April 28, 1892, served and filed in court his affidavit and motion for an order directing a resale of said property. Respondents appealed to this court from the order of March 18,1892, confirming said sales. On March 23, 1892, the parties made a written agreement and stipulation, in which, after a recital of the foregoing facts, it was stipulated that the appellant herein “shall consent that his motion of resale be continued until after said appeal to the supreme court shall be determined”; and that if the order confirming the sale should be affirmed by the supreme court, the re[573]spondents herein should pay to the appellant, “within thirty days after the determination of said appeal against them, the unpaid balance of the purchase price of the lots of land purchased by them respectively as aforesaid, on receipt of the deeds of said properties respectively.” This stipulation, as originally drafted, contained the following clause: “With interest thereon from the date of said order of confirmation at the rate of five per cent per annum”; but this clause was erased before execution, and there was inserted in its stead, in the handwriting of the attorney of the purchasers, the final words of the stipulation, viz: “On receipt of the deeds of said properties respectively.”
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