People v. Martin

California Supreme Court May 31, 1894 No. No. 21030Published

Before: Garoutte

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Holding. The court held that a criminal prosecution for obtaining property by false pretenses is not barred by the fact that the victim may have intended to engage in a dishonest act, nor by the existence of a contract between the parties.

Issues

Whether the alleged dishonest intent of a defrauded party bars a criminal prosecution for false pretenses.
Whether a contract between the defendant and the victim precludes a criminal prosecution for obtaining property under false pretenses.
Whether the false pretenses were too remote from the transfer of property because a contract intervened.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“The offense is committed against the public, and not against the individual.”

“There is no principle of law that will bar the state from prosecuting a criminal because some other person is a particeps criminis.”

“It is impossible to contend seriously that the case is not within the statute because the chattel is obtained under a contract induced by the false pretense.”

Synopsis

Criminal Law—Obtaining Property Under False Pretenses—Transfer With Intent to Defraud Creditors.—The offense of obtaining money or other personal property by false and. fraudulent pretenses is committed against the public, and not against the individual, and there is no principle of law that will bar the state from prosecuting a criminal because some other person is a partiaeps criminis; and an information charging that the false pretenses consisted of representations to the person defrauded by the defendant, that a judgment in a large sum of money had been obtained against her in another state, and that, believing such statements, she was induced to, and did, transfer her property to the defendant in order to avoid the application of her property to the satisfaction of such judgment, states a public offense, which is not affected or barred by the intention of the person defrauded.

Id.—Offense Distinguished From Grand Larceny—Assignment in Trust.—In grand larceny, the owner of the property does not intend te part with the title and possession of it, while, in the offense of obtaining property under false pretenses, the owner does intend to part with the title and possession; and the offense is not grand larceny where the title to the property is transferred by the assignment thereof in trust.

Id.—Agreement For Support—State Not Estopped.—The fact that the assignment entered into appears on its face to be a valid agreement for the transfer of property, in consideration of an agreement upon the part of the defendant to support and care for the prosecutrix during the remainder of her life, does not estop the state, which is not a party to the contract, from proving that the transfer was fraudulently induced by false pretenses for the purpose of avoiding the application of the property of the prosecutrix to the satisfaction of a judgment fraudulently represented as existing against her; and the rules of evidence in civil cases as to a direct or collateral attack upon the contract by any of the parties to it are entirely inapplicable.

Id.—Variance Between Allegations and Proof.—Where there is no variance between the allegations and the proof as to portions of the property described in the information, a variance as to a particular piece of property is in no way fatal to a judgment of conviction.

Id.—Contract Induced by False Pretenses—Property Obtained Under Contract.—The fact that the written contract entered into between the parties was induced by false pretenses does not prevent a prosecution for the obtaining of property under the contract as a result of the false pretenses, there being a causal relation between the pretenses and the transfer of the property.

Id.—Evidence—Objections to Weight of Testimony.—Where objections to evidence go to the weight of the testimony, rather than to its admissibility, the court does not err in admitting it, although it is somewhat remote, and relates to an incident not directly traceable to the accused.

Garoutte, J. The appellant was convicted of obtaining money and other personal property from one Sarah E. Leonard by false and fraudulent pretenses. The information is laid under section 532 of the Penal Code, and the false pretenses upon which it is based consisted in the representations to said Leonard by the defendant that a judgment in a large sum of money had been obtained against her in the state of New York, and that her property would be seized and sold to satisfy such judgment. The information further states that said Leonard believed such statements, and, so believing, and in order to avoid the application of her property to the satisfaction of such judgment, she was induced to, and did, transfer and deliver said property to defendant.

The information contained various allegations other than those just noticed, and a demurrer was offered thereto upon various grounds; but we think the information well drawn,'and our consideration of the alleged defects therein will be limited to the contention of appellant that the allegations we have in substance [563]quoted therefrom constitute a bar to the prosecution of the accused. Possibly the state might be barred from conducting a criminal prosecution by reason of the acts of its duly constituted officers representing the state in such matters; but it is a novel proposition that the acts and conduct of a private individual, even though such individual be what is termed in law the prosecuting witness, could, under any imaginable circumstances, bar the state from the prosecution of a criminal. Appellant states her position as follows:

“ If, at the time that Sarah E. Leonard placed her property in the possession of the defendant, she believed that there was a valid and existing judgment for seventeen thousand dollars or eighteen thousand dollars against her in the state of New York, and she placed her property out of her hands to avoid its being applied towards the satisfaction of such judgment, her intentions were dishonest, and she was herself guilty of a criminal offense, and became particeps criminis.”

The case of McCord v. People, 46 N. Y. 472, appears to support the doctrine insisted upon by appellant, but the great weight of authority is to the contrary. It is said by the court in Commonwealth v. Morrill, 8 Cush. 571: “Supposing that to be otherwise, and it should appear that Lynch (the party defrauded) had also violated the statute, that would not justify the defendants; if the other party has also subjected himself to a prosecution for alike offense, he also may be punished. This would be much better than that both should escape punishment because each deserved it equally.” The doctrine of the foregoing case is approved by Mr. Bishop, in his work on Criminal Law, section 469, eighth edition. The principle is also declared in the same work at sections 256 and 257. See, also, In re Cummins, 16 Col. 451, 25 Am. St. Rep. 291. From any aspect of the case the contention has no sound support. If the party defrauded is also guilty of a violation of the law he, too, should be prosecuted, rather than his offense should serve as a shield to the other’s crime.

People v. Martin

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