People v. Monaghan
Before: Temple
Synopsis
Criminal Law— Pleading.—Where a plea of not guilty in a criminal case is withdrawn, and a demurrer interposed to the indictment, which was overruled, and time granted to the defendant to plead, a trial and conviction of the defendant without a new plea cannot be sustained.
Id.—Granting of Time to Plead—Presumptions.—The granting of time to plead after the demurrer was overruled must he presumed to have been upon the application of the defendant, and raises a presumption that he was not then prepared to plead not guilty, and rebuts a presumption that it was understood that the original plea of not guilty was then to stand as his plea.
Id.—Judgment Upon Declining to Plead.—The provision of section 1011 of the Penal Code for a judgment where the defendant declines to plead, after his demurrer is disallowed, cannot support the legality of a trial and judgment entered upon a verdict without a plea.
Id. —Declining to Plead Must Be Actual.—Judgment cannot be pronounced against the defendant under section 1011 of the Penal Code, unless he in fact declines to plead after his demurrer is overruled, and cannot be rendered upon mere omission to plead.
Id.—Waiver of Plea—Trial Without Objection.—The absolute requirement of the law that the accused must plead personally to the indictment on arraignment cannot be cured by the fact that he was brought into court and tried without objection.
Temple, C. Appellant was indicted by the grand jury of the city and county of San Francisco for the crime of obtaining money by false pretenses.
The record shows that defendant was duly arraigned July 23, 1892, and plead not guilty, and was allowed until July 30th to withdraw the plea.
July 30th of the same year the plea was withdrawn and a demurrer to the indictment entered and time allowed to file briefs. The record shows that the demurrers were finally submitted, and December 28, 1892, it was ordered that the demurrer be overruled, and the cause continued to December 31,1892, for defendant to plead.
The record does not show that any thing was done in the case on December 31st, but April 8tli the cause was continued by consent'to April 15th.
No appearance is noted for April 15th, but on May 23d there is an entry in the clerk’s minutes (after title of court and cause), in these words: “ May 23d for trial.” May 23d the defendant and his counsel were in court, and the trial commenced. A jury was impaneled, the indictment read to the jury, and a statement made to the jury by the clerk that a plea of not guilty had been entered.
The trial then proceeded in due order, no objection being made on the ground that defendant had not plead to the indictment, but the defendant was tried in all respects as though the plea of not guilty had been entered. Evidence upon such supposed issue was put in both by the people and by the defendant. Whether the defendant asked for instructions does not appear, but his coun[231]sel made an argument in his behalf to the jury. The jury returned the verdict:
“ We, the jury, find the defendant guilty as charged in the indictment, and fix the value of the property obtained by the defendant to be one thousand ($1,000) dollars.”
When the time arrived for passing judgment defendant’s counsel objected, because defendant had not been legally convicted, and the court could not make to the defendant the statements required by section 1200 of the Penal Code, to wit: his plea.
The defendant then made a motion in arrest of judgment, which was overruled, and a motion for new trial, which was denied.
The. sole question raised on this appeal relates to the legality of the trial and conviction of the defendant without a plea. The people do not controvert the main proposition that a plea is necessary before there can be a trial. Until there is an issue there is nothing to try. Blackstone tells us (4 Blackstone’s Commentaries, 325) the great pains which were taken to compel a defendant to plead and the terrible consequences which sometimes resulted from his standing mute. Wherever the common law prevails criminal procedures have carefully provided for the arraignment of accused persons, that they shall be fully informed of the charge against them, and of their right to plead. Some formalities are enjoined upon criminal courts, partly to have record evidence that there has been a fair trial, and partly to make it sure that an accused person has not been deprived of a substantial right through caprice or negligence of the judge or prosecuting officer. (See Pen. Code, secs. 987 et seq., 1066, 1200.)
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