Ames v. City of San Diego
Before: Haven
Synopsis
Pueblo Lands—Public Trust—Adverse Possession.—Land acquired from the United States by a city as successor to a former pueblo, held in trust for the general public for a specific public use, as a park, or for a street, or for public buildings, cannot be alienated, and the title of the public thereto cannot be lost by a possession adverse to the city.
Id.—House Lots—Power of Alienation—Prescription.—In the case of pueblo lands, such as house lots, the legal title of which is vested in the city, and which may be alienated by it, the title of the city thereto may be lost by adverse possession for the period of time required to acquire a prescriptive title under the statute of limitations.
Id.—Findings—Presumption—Support of Judgment.—Where the findings in an action to determine an adverse claim to land state facts showing a prescriptive title in the plaintiffs, and also that the land in controversy was patented by the United States to the city defendant as the pueblo lands of the defendant, “in trust for municipal purposes,” without stating that the land in controversy was held by the defendant in trust for a specified public use, it must be presumed in favor of the judgment that the land was a house lot which the pueblo was authorized to convey, and the findings are sufficient to support a judgment for the plaintiffs.
Id.—Conflict in Findings—Liberal Construction.—Findings are to be liberally construed in support of judgment, and, if possible, are to be reconciled so as to prevent a conflict upon material points, and, unless the conflict is clear, and the findings are incapable of being harmoniously construed, a judgment will not be reversed upon the ground of the conflict in the findings.
De Haven, J. The plaintiffs are husband and wife, and this action was brought for the purpose of determining an adverse claim made by the defendant to certain land which, the complaint alleges, is owned by the plaintiff, Catalina S. Ames. The answer alleges that the defendant is the owner of the land in controversy, and this was the only issue made by the pleadings. The action was tried by the court without a jury, and judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiffs. The defendant appeals from the judgment, and from an order denying its motion for a new trial. It is claimed by the defendant that the findings do not support the judgment, and also that the finding in respect to the plaintiffs’ adverse possession is not justified by the evidence.
The court did not find, in direct terms, that the plaintiff, Catalina A. Ames, is the owner of the land in dispute, but it found the following among other facts:
[392]“ 2. That ever since the year 1846 the said plaintiffs and their grantors have been continuously in possession of the lands and premises hereinafter described, claiming the same adversely to defendant, and that the-same have been during the whole of said time inclosed with a substantial fence; and that there has been erected, and is now standing, on said lands a two-story adobe dwelling-house, and a frame dwelling-house, and that said adobe dwelling-house has been occupied by said plaintiffs and their grantors as a dwelling continuously from the said year 1846.”
“ 4. That on the tenth day of April, 1874, the title of said defendant as successor to the Mexican pueblo-of San Diego was confirmed, and that on said day a patent was -issued to defendant by the United States-of America for the land and premises hereinafter described, with other lands, as the pueblo lands of said defendant, and in trust for municipal purposes.”
The foregoing finding numbered two, although somewhat informal, was evidently intended as a finding to the effect that the plaintiffs had, before the commencement of this action, acquired title to the premises in controversy by adverse possession, and that such is its proper construction is not denied by counsel for defendant; but it is urged that the latter finding, numbered four, is in conflict with the former, and shows that plaintiffs ¿[id not and could not have acquired such a title as against defendant.
The finding last above quoted shows clearly that the-defendant city obtained from the United States title to the land in controversy as the successor of the former-pueblo of San Diego, and it is well settled in this state that land thus acquired cannot be sold under an execution issued upon a money judgment against the city succeeding to the rights of the pueblo. (Hart v. Burnett, 15 Cal. 530; San Francisco v. Ganavan, 42 Cal. 541; Townsend v. Greely, 5 Wall. 326.) The reason for this rule is that such lands are not held as the absolute property of the city, but in trust for its inhabitants. The
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