Marceau v. Travelers' Ins. Co.
Before: Beatty, Garoutte
Synopsis
Criminal Law—Insanity as a Defense.—Insanity, as recognized in the criminal law of this state, is such a diseased and deranged condition of the mental faculties as to render the person incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong in relation to the particular act with which he is charged.
Id.—Irresistible Impulse.—Irresistible impulse, so called, is not, of itself, a legal defense to a charge of felony.
Life Insurance—Death Caused by Insane Person—Evidence—Ruling Without Prejudice—Abstract Testimony of Expert Witness.—In an action upon a life insurance policy where the company seeks to avoid liability upon the ground that the insured was killed by a third person, and the plaintiff claims that the person doing the killing was insane at the time he committed the deed, the allowance of a question asked an expert on insanity as to whether he understood “that if a person is insane while they may theoretically know the difference between right and wrong, that they are incapable of judging or resisting an impulse to do wrong? ” to which the witness answered that “they have no power to resist the insane impulse they have, although they know it was wrong, and they will hide and conceal the evidence of their crime, very often with more particularity and ingenuity than a sane person would do,” is not prejudicial error, the testimony being in the abstract to a certain phase or kind of insanity, and not addressed to the mental condition of the person killing the insured.
Id.—Objectionable Question—Harmless Answer.—However objectionable a question may be, if the answer in no way prejudices the appellant’s rights, error of the court in allowing the answer to he given is harmless. „
Id.—Improper Instructions—Abuse of Plea of Insanity.—In a civil action upon an insurance policy, where the party who killed the insured, and whose insanity is in question, is not a party to the action nor indirectly interested in the final result of the litigation, an instruction to the jury intimating that the plea of insanity has led to abuse in the administration of justice, and advising the jury that it must be examined and considered with care, although proper in a criminal case, should not be given.
Id.—Evidence—Conviction of Murder—Sanity of Accused.—In the civil action upon the insurance policy, the judgment-roll in the criminal prosecution of the person who killed the insured, showing that he had been convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, but which contained no suggestions as to his insanity, is not admissible in evidence on the part of the insurance company for the purpose of showing that the accused could not have been insane at the time.
Id.—Facts Observed by Witnesses—Withdrawal of Opinion Evi- , pence.—Upon the question of insanity the statements of witnesses as to the peculiar conduct and conversation of the person charged with insanity as observed by the witnesses, are competent evidence, although they are not intimate acquaintances within the meaning of section 1870, subdivision 10, of the Code of Civil Procedure, nor experts, whose opinions may be given upon the question of sanity or insanity; and the withdrawal of their opinions from the jury, does not carry with it their testimony as to the facts observed by them.
Opinion — Garoutte
Garoutte, J. The plaintiff and respondent, Mrs. Marcean, was the wife of John D. Fiske, of Fresno. In July, 1890, Fiske was shot to death by one Stillman, who was subsequently convicted of the crime, and sentenced to imprisonment for life. At the time of Fiske’s death he was carrying a life insurance policy for the [341]sum of ten thousand dollars in the Travelers’ Insurance Company, and this action is brought to recover from such company the amount of the policy. The policy contained a clause declaring it invalid if death resulted from “intentional injuries inflicted by the insured or any other person.” And while the death of Fiske is not questioned by the defendant, it is claimed that his death resulted from causes that bring it within the prohibition of the clause of the policy we have just quoted, and that consequently plaintiff is not entitled to recover.
It is contended upon the part of plaintiff that Stillman was insane at the time he committed the homicide, and consequently the injuries resulting in the death of Fiske were not “intentional injuries,” within the meaning of the policy. It is conceded by opposing counsel that if Stillman was insane at the time he fired the fatal shot the policy remains in full force and effect; and thus it appears the insanity of Stillman at the time of the homicide is the fulcrum upon which the entire case rests. Judgment went for plaintiff, and this appeal is prosecuted from that judgment, and also from an order denying defendant’s motion for a new trial.
1. An expert witness upon the subject of insanity was placed upon the stand, and the following occurred:
“Q. You understand, of' course, that insanity is the result of a diseased mind, do you not ? A. Yes, sir.
“ Q. That if a person is insane, while they may theoretically know the difference between right and wrong, that they are incapable of judging or resisting an impulse to do wrong?
“ The defendant objected to the question, on the ground that it is incompetent, the witness is incompetent, and the fact is irrelevant and immaterial, as contradicting the rule of insanity established by the supreme court of this state. The court overruled the objection, and the defendant excepted.
“A. They have no power to resist the insane impulse they have, although they know it is wrong, and they
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