Hart v. Carnall-Hopkins Co.
Before: Harrison, Paterson
Synopsis
Justice’s Court—Jurisdiction—Contract to “Locate” Plaintiff on Government Land—Title and Possession of Real Property—Appeal to Supreme Court—Dismissal.—Where an action was brought in the justice’s court to recover damages for a breach of contract to “ locate” the plaintiff on certain vacant government land, and the defendant in its answer alleged that it did “locate” the plaintiff on vacant government land as agreed, and that no other person had any valid claim thereto, and that in consequence thereof the determination of the action would necessarily involve the question of title and possession of real property, a motion in the supreme court to dismiss an appeal from a judgment rendered in the superior court, on the ground that the justice’s court had jurisdiction of the action, and the judgment of the superior court was final, will be denied.
Id.—Original Jurisdiction op Superior Court—Appeal prom Justice’s Court.—The superior court has original jurisdiction of the subject matter of an action for damages for breach of a contract involving a question as to the title or possession of real property, and the fact that the case gained ingress to the court by appeal from the judgment of a justice’s court rendered upon the merits of the case cannot affect the original jurisdiction of the superior court to hear and determine the cause.
Opinion — Paterson
Paterson, J.— This action was brought in the justice’s court to recover the sum of two hundred and ninety-nine dollars and ninety-nine cents on a contract which reads as follows:
“San Francisco, July 22, 1892.
“Received of J. D. Hart, Esq., one hundred ($100) dollars, in full payment for ten (10) shares of the capital stock of the San Carlos Oil Company, and our services for locating the said J. D. Hart, Esq., on the limit •of the number of acres allowed by the homestead law, not to exceed one hundred and sixty (160) acres. Said location to be on vacant government land in San Benito •county, California.
“The Carnall-Hopkins Company,
“ By Gibbs & Zimmerman,
“ Mngs. C. A. Hep.”
It is alleged in the complaint that defendant failed to locate the plaintiff on certain vacant government land, or any land at all. In a verified answer the defendant denied each and every allegation of the complaint, and alleged that a determination of the action would necessarily involve the question of title and possession of real property; that the defendant did locate plaintiff on vacant government land in San Benito county, and that no person had any valid claim thereto at the time. Judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of one hundred and sixty-five dollars, ten dollars interest and costs of suit. Thereupon the defendant appealed to the superior court on questions of law and fact, where judgment was again entered in favor of plaintiff, and from this judgment defendant has appealed to this court.
[162]Respondent has moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that as the justice’s court had jurisdiction of the cause of action, the judgment of the superior court was final.
Our code provides that “the parties to an action in a justice’s court cannot give evidence upon any question which involves the title or possession of real property . . . . ; and if it appear from the answer of the defendant, verified by his oath, that the determination of the faction will necessarily involve the question of title or possession to real property, .... the justice must suspend all further proceedings in the action, and certify the pleadings .... to the superior court of the county.” The constitution gives the superior court jurisdiction in “ all cases at law which involve the title or possession of real property. The question is whether the issue as framed in the justice’s court involved the title or possession of real property.” In Holman v. Taylor, 31 Cal. 338, the court said: “The idea intended to be embodied in the phrase, ‘cases at law which involve the title or possession of real property,’ may be expressed by the paraphrase, ‘cases at law in which the title or possession of real property is a material fact in the case, upon which the plaintiff relies for a recovery, or the defendant for a defense.’” In Copertini v. Opperman, 76 Cal. 181, it was held that a vendee’s right to recover a sum less than three hundred dollars in the justice’s court caused by a defect in the title of the vendor depended primarily upon whether the defendants had a defective or good title which they'had contracted to sell, and that the superior court had original jurisdiction to hear and determine the controversy, although the amount claimed was less than three hundred dollars.
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