Lowe v. Woods

Garoutte, J. This is an action brought by livery and feed stable keepers to foreclose a lien upon a horse for the feeding of the animal. The horse was placed by defendant Woods in charge of plaintiffs, he agreeing to pay the sum of twenty dollars per month for his care and feed. At this time Woods was in. possession under a contract of purchase from the defendant, Adams, the true owner, the agreement between them being that he should have the use of the horse, and should feed and care for him, but that the title should remain in Adams until the sum agreed upon was paid; and that event never came to pass. It was further expressly stipulated by these parties that Woods should keep the horse with[410]out cost or expense to Adams, and that upon his failure to pay the amount stipulated it should be redelivered without cost or expense. This appeal is prosecuted by defendant Adams from a judgment foreclosing the lien and ordering a sale of the horse.

Among other matters, it is found by the trial court that'Adams was at all the times mentioned in the complaint the owner of the horse; that Woods informed plaintiffs at the time they received the horse that Adams was the owner thereof, and within one week thereafter plaintiffs had full knowledge of the terms and conditions of the contract by virtue of which Woods had possession. It thus appears that the court not only found the ownership of the horse to be in appellant Adams, but found that respondents had knowledge of the fact upon the first day of their possession, and within a few days subsequent thereto had complete and perfect information of all the circumstances surrounding Woods’ possession. There is certainly no principle of law that would entitle plaintiffs to a lien upon this horse after they became conversant with the character of Woods’ possession, and all the terms of the agreement under which he held. But we will not consider the effect of the finding of the court that plaintiffs were informed by Woods when the horse was placed in their care that Adams was the owner thereof, as we are prepared to take a broader view and hold that in this case, as disclosed by its entire history, no lien whatever was created in favor of plaintiffs.

That portion of section 3051 of the Civil Code bearing upon this question is as follows: “And livery or boarding, or feed stable proprietors, and persons pasturing horses or stock, have a lien dependent on possession for their compensation in caring for, boarding, feeding, or pasturing such horses or stock.” In Dorman v. Green, 4 Tex. App. Civ. Cas. 563, under a statute in all material respects similar to the provisions of our code, and upon a state of facts involving the principle presented in this appeal, the supreme court of that state said: “This is not a question of notice, but a matter of property right