People v. Kindleberger

California Supreme Court Nov 27, 1893 No. No. 21020Published

Before: Haven

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Holding. The trial court committed reversible error by expressing its opinion on the weight of the evidence and the necessity of a guilty verdict, which improperly influenced the jury.

Issues

Whether the trial judge's remarks to a deadlocked jury regarding the evidence constituted prejudicial error.
Whether a subsequent instruction regarding the jury's role as sole judges of fact cured the judge's prior expression of opinion.

Disposition. reversed and remanded

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“In thus addressing the jury the learned judge of the superior court committed an error, to the prejudice of the defendant.”

“The court has no right, except when advising an acquittal, to give any expression of its opinion as to the weight of evidence”

Synopsis

Criminal Law—Trial—Disagreement of Jurors—Prejudicial Statement of Judge.—The action of the judge of the trial court in a criminal prosecution, in stating in answer to a statement of a juror that the jurors were unable to agree, that “in view of the testimony in this case the court is utterly at a loss to know why twelve honest men cannot agree in this case,” without advising an acquittal, would probably give the jury to understand that the judge believed the defendant guilty, and that such ought to be their verd'ct, and is prejudicial error.

Id.—Error Not Cured.—Such error is not cured by the fact that in a subsequent part of the charge to the jury the judge informed them that they were the sole judges of fact and of the credibility of witnesses, and that the court had no right to trench upon their province in this respect.

De Haven, J. The defendant was found guilty of the crime of assault with intent to commit rape, and was sentenced by the judgment of the superior court to imprisonment in the state prison for a term of seven years. The appeal here is from the judgment, and is brought to this court upon the judgment-roll alone, without any bill of exceptions. The jury retired to deliberate upon their verdict at nine o’clock in the evening, and, not having agreed, the jurors, upon their own request, were brought into court at ten o’cclock in the forenoon of the next day, when the following proceedings took place:

“ The Court. Well, upon what point do you desire instruction or points?

[368]“A Juror. By request of the jurymen I would ask if there could be any other form of verdict in the case?

“ The Court. Is that all ?

‘‘A Juror. That is all; except that we are unable to agree. No prospect of agreeing.

“ The Court. In reply to the latter part of the statement, that the jury are unable to agree, and that there is no prospect of their agreeing, the court has this to say: that in view of the testimony in this case, the court is utterly at a loss to know why twelve honest men cannot agree in this case. Let me have that information, please. In that connection, further, I have this to say, that in my short experience upon the bench I have occasionally been associated with juries where some jurors having an idea that they are smart men, prominent men, with large heads and big capacity, on going to the jury-room, take occasion to express ill-digested and rapid opinions upon the case, and then stick to these opinions, right or wrong, unreasonably refusing to listen to the opinion and arguments of their fellow-jurors, and so hang a jury. I have on some occasions, having something of a personal knowledge of jurors on the jury, taken occasion to caution the jurors against that course, and to say that jurors ought to go into the jury-box without prejudice, without fear, without favor, with a desire to arrive at the truth, to sift and digest the testimony carefully and conscientiously, and not stubbornly to express an ill-digested opinion and stick to it.

“I repeat, gentlemen, that I see no reason on earth why a jury in this case, upon this testimony, cannot agree.”

In thus addressing the jury the learned judge of the superior court committed an error, to the prejudice of the defendant. Nothing can be clearer than that in this charge the. judge informed the jury that he had a fixed and definite conviction in regard to the verdict which they ought to return, and that in his opinion the evidence to support such conclusion was so plain and

People v. Kindleberger

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