People v. Douglass
Before: Haven
Synopsis
Appeal—Presumption Against Error.—On appeal all intendments are in favor of the regularity of action of the trial court. Error will never be presumed, hut must affirmatively appear.
Id.—Continuance op Criminal Cause—Presumption of Consent.— When the record upon appeal'does not show that a continuance of a criminal cause was objected to by the defendant it will be presumed in favor of the action of the court below that the defendant consented to the order.
Id.—Failure to Bring Defendant to Trial Within Sixty Days—Motion to Dismiss—Error Not Appearing.—A judgment of conviction in a criminal proceeding will not he reversed upon appeal because of the failure of the prosecution to bring the defendant to trial within sixty days after the filing of the information, where the bill of exceptions is entirely silent as to the orders of the court postponing the trial and refusing to dismiss the prosecution, and there is nothing in the transcript upon appeal as to the orders, except the record entries made by the clerk of the trial court, which fail to show any objection by the defendant to the continuance, or that good cause for denying the motion to dismiss was not shown by the prosecution.
Criminal Law—Evidence—Testimony Taken at Preliminary Examination— Death of Witness — Admission.—Where it is admitted, upon the trial of a defendant charged with the commission of a crime, that one of the witnesses, whose testimony was taken upon the preliminary examination, is dead, it is proper to read in evidence bis testimony taken before the committing magistrate, which had been taken, down in shorthand, transcribed, certified, and filed, as required by section 869 of the Penal Code; and an objection thereto upon the ground “ that due diligence has not been shown to bring this witness before the court to obtain his evidence in the regular way” is properly overruled.
Id.—Instructions—Court Not Bound to Repeat Itself—Failure to Indorse Ground of Refusal—Harmless Error—The trial court may refuse to give the jury an instruction asked for by the defendant in a criminal prosecution, which is given in substance in other instructions. The court is not bound to repeat itself, and its failure to indorse upon the refused instruction the ground of refusal is not prejudicial error for which the judgment can be reversed.
Id.—Presumption of Innocence.—The refusal of the court to instruct the jury that “ where there are two presumptions, one in favor of innocence, and the other in favor of a criminal course, the one in favor of innocence must prevail ” is not errbr. The only presumption in a criminal case is of the innocence of the defendant, until guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt, and it is sufficient if the court has so charged the jury.
Opinion
The Court. The defendant was convicted of the crime of grand larceny, charged to have been committed April 9, 1892, in Tehama county, by feloniously stealing, taking, and carrying away one cow, the property of H. C. Wilson.
The information was filed April 29,1892, and on May 4th the defendant was arraigned, and pleaded not guilty to the charge. On May 9th, by order of court, the trial of the case was set for June 8tli. On the last-named day, on motion of the district attorney, the trial was postponed to a day to be thereafter set. On July 2d counsel for defendant moved the court that he be discharged, on the ground that he had not been tried within sixty days after the filing of the information. The motion was denied, and an exception reserved. On August 27th the case was again set for trial on September 21st. At the time so set the trial was commenced, and on the next day concluded with a verdict of “ guilty [3]of grand larceny as charged in the information.” In due time the defendant moved for a new trial, which was denied, and thereupon'judgment was pronounced that he be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for the term of three years. From this judgment and the order denying his motion for a new trial the defendant appeals.
1. Appellant contends that the judgment should be reversed, because under the provisions of section 1382 of the Penal Code, as construed in People v. Morino, 85 Cal. 515, he was, on July 2d, entitled to be discharged from further prosecution, and the court had no discretion or right to deny his motion of that date for a discharge.
This position is rested upon the theory that the court had no authority on June 8th to postpone the trial without the consent of the defendant, unless upon affidavit showing good cause therefor, and that no such consent was given or showing made.
The section of the code referred to is as follows:
“The court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, must order the prosecution to be dismissed in the following cases.....
“2. If a defendant, whose trial has not been postponed upon his application, is not brought to trial within sixty days after the finding of the indictment, or filing of the information.”
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