Towle v. Carmelo Land & Coal Co.
Before: Haven
Synopsis
Vendor and Purchaser—Contract of Sale—Description of Land—Extrinsic Evidence—Specific Performance The subject-matter of an agreement for the sale of land must all be included in the memorandum, and be described with sufficient exactness to render its identity certain upon the introduction of extrinsic evidence disclosing the situation of the parties; but if, upon reading the contract in the light of the facts shown by such extrinsic evidence, it appears clear what land the vendor intended to convey and the vendee intended to purchase, the description will be deemed sufficiently certain, and the contract will be specifically enforced.
Id.—Description of Part of Rancho—Pleading—Evidence__The description in a contract for the sale of land, by which the grantors of the defendant agreed to convey to plaintiff all that portion of a rancho in his occupation and possession on a certain date, is sufficiently certain, and in an action for the specific performance of such agreement the plaintiff may allege and- prove the specific boundaries of the land thus generally described, and that no part of it was within the description of lands excepted from the agreement.
Id. — Contract with Distinct Parties—Action for Speoifio Performance— Parties—Non-joinder__Where the contract which is the basis of an action for specific performance shows upon its face that it was as between defendant’s grantors and each of the other persons signing it, a separate and distinct contract, entitling each person to purchase that part of a rancho of which he was in possession at a specified date, it is not necessary for one in possession of a specific part to join the possessors of other parts as parties defendant in an action to enforce specific performance of the distinct contract with the plaintiff! or to join any other parties to the contract who do not appear to have an interest in the specific tract claimed by the plaintiff, and a demurrer for the nonjoinder of such parties should be overruled.
De Haven, J. Action to enforce the specific performance of an agreement for the conveyance of land forming a part of the Rancho San Jose y Sur Chiquito. The superior court gave judgment in favor of plaintiff in accordance with the prayer of the complaint, and the defendant appeals. The appeal is upon the judgment roll alone, and this contains no bill of exceptions. The only grounds urged for a reversal of the judgment which we deem necessary to notice in this opinion arise upon the face of the complaint.
[3981]. The contract which is the subject of this action was entered into between the grantors of defendant as parties of the first part, and the plaintiff and several other named persons parties of the second part, and, so far as necessary to be here stated, is as follows: —
“This memorandum of agreement .... witnesseth that the parties of the first part covenant and agree with all of the parties of the second part, that upon the confirmation of the title to said rancho they will convey to the said several parties of the second part the land within the limits of said rancho, and in occupation and possession of each of said parties on the first day of July, 1881, in severalty, at the rate of one dollar and a quarter per acre; provided .... that coal lands and also lands within a mile of the bay or landing known as the Emery and Bassett or Stone Quarry Landing, are not included in this agreement.”
It is claimed by the defendant that the description of the land agreed to be conveyed is so uncertain that the contract is not one which can be specifically enforced by a court of equity. The rule is of course a familiar one that the subject-matter, the particular land to be conveyed, is an essential term in every agreement for the sale of land, and unless this subject-matter is so described that it can be identified, a court of equity will not undertake to enforce it; but while this is so, it is equally well settled that the description need not be so clear and precise as to make a resort to extrinsic evidence unnecessary. (Pomeroy on Contracts, sec. 90.) This learned author, in the section just cited, says: “The subject-matter of the agreement must all be included in the memorandum, and must be described with sufficient exactness to render its identity certain upon the introduction of extrinsic evidence simply disclosing the situation of the parties at and immediately before the time of making the contract.” If, upon reading the contract in the light of the facts shown by such extrinsic evidence, it appears clear what land the vendor intended to convey and the vendee intended to purchase, the description will be deemed sufficiently certain. This proposition is forcibly illustrated in the cases of Preble v. Abrahams, 88 Cal. 245; 22 Am. St. Rep. 301, and Mead v. Parker, 115 Mass. 413; 15 Am. Rep. 110, and many others might be cited to sustain it.
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