People v. Squires
Before: Temple
Synopsis
Ckiminal Law—Indictment—Date of Offense—Pbiobity of Offense to Accusation. — it is not necessary that an indictment for a criminal offense shall show that the offense was committed on a day prior to the time of the filing of the indictment, but it is sufficient if it can be understood therefrom “that the offense was committed at some time prior to the time of finding the indictment ”; and an indictment alleging the commission of an offense upon the same day on which the indictment is filed sufficiently shows that the act charged was commitited prior to the filing of the indictment. To accuse is to state that the act charged was prior to the accusation.
Id.—Offense Committed on Date of Accusation—Reactions of Day. — Courts disregard fractions of days when necessary; and one may he accused of an offense on the very day of its commission.
Id Evidence of Date. —The proof need not show that the offense was committed on the day named in the indictment.
Id. — Request of Jubob fob Bbibe—Sufficiency of Indictment—Agbeement— Offek of Jubob. —An indictment of a defendant for asking for and agreeing to receive a bribe as a juror, need not charge that he asked for or agreed to receive it upon any agreement or understanding with the person approached that he , would cast his vote in consideration thereof; but it is sufficient to aver that the accused offered or was ready to make such agreement or understanding. It is not necessary to complete the offense that the party approached should consent to give the bribe.
Id.—Cebtainty of Indictment.—An indictment charging a defendant with asking for and soliciting a bribe and charging the elements of the offense defined in section 93 of the Penal Code, is not uncertain as to whether the offense is charged under that section or section 96 of the code which does not make it an offense to solicit a bribe.
Id.—Evidence of Good Faith of Pboseouting Witnesses — Obdek of Pboof— Habmless Bbkob.—In a criminal prosecution for asking for and soliciting a bribe as a juror, where the defendant claimed that the prosecuting witnesses were really trying to bribe him, and that he simply declined to be bribed, evidence of one of such witnesses that the defendant intimated that he was willing to receive a bribe, and that witness then consulted the judge in regard to the matter before he called at the defendant’s store and received the offer to be bribed, is admissible as showing that his own conduct in connection with the matter was not improper and was taken in good faith, and the admission of such evidence at the wrong time is not prejudicial error.
Id. — Offer of Juror to Proodre Verdict.—An offer of a juror in a civil case to procure a verdict for the defendant for a specified sum, though showing that he proposed to do more than merely cast his vote as a juror, includes an offer to promise that in certain contingencies he would cast his vote as a juror for the defendant, and the offense of asking for a bribe as a juror is thereby made out.
Temple, C. The defendant was convicted of a felony in asking for and agreeing to receive a bribe as a juror. He appeals from the judgment and from an order refusing a new trial. The indictment upon which he was tried was found, presented, and tiled June 7, 1892, and charges that on the seventh day of June, 1892, while defendant was a juror in a case on trial in the superior court of San Francisco, the pend-ency of which is particularly set out and described in the indictment, “said Squires did wilfully, unlawfully, corruptly, and feloneously ask and agree to receive of and from one James F. Smith, one of the attorneys for defendants in said civil action, the sum of five hundred dollars, in lawful money of the United States, upon an agreement which he, the said J. H. Squires, then and there offered to make and enter into with said James F. Smith, that in consideration of the payment to the said J. H. Squires of the sum of five hundred dollars, in lawful money of the United States, he, the said J. H. Squires, would cast his vote and render his decision as juror in said civil action in favor of the defendants in said civil action,” etc.
Defendant was prosecuted under section 93 of the Penal [329]Code, which enacts: “Every .... juror .... who asks, receives, or agrees to receive any bribe upon any agreement or understanding that his vote, opinion, or decision shall be influenced thereby is punishable,” etc.
The defendant demurred to the indictment, and after a verdict against him moved an arrest of judgment, in both modes raising the questions herein discussed as to the sufficiency of the indictment.
1. The first objection to the indictment is that it does not charge that the offense was committed prior to the finding of the indictment.
Our statute does not require that the indictment shall show that the offense was committed on a day prior to the time of filing the indictment, as do the statutes in some of the states, from which authorities are cited by appellant, but the indictment is sufficient if it can be understood therefrom (Penal Code, subd. 5, sec. 959) “that the offense was committed at some time prior to the time of finding the indictment.” The usual course is to charge the commission of the offense on a named day which is prior to the day of finding the indictment. The proof need not show that the offense was committed on the day named. It is ordinarily sufficient if both the day named and on which the offense is proven to have been committed are within the statute of limitations and prior to the finding of the indictment. In this case it might have been charged that the offense was committed on the sixth and proven to have been committed on the seventh and prior to the finding of the indictment. But while courts no not generally take note of fractions of days, they do when necessary. To accuse one of the commission of a crime is to charge that it was committed prior to the accusation. Where the indictment expressly states that an offense was committed on a date subsequent to the day of the accusation, it charges an impossible act. On the face of the indictment, therefore, the accused cannot be guilty. Under a statute like ours, I think this is all there can be in a point of this character. But that is not this case. One may be accused of an offense on the very day of its commission; and, as already said, to accuse is to state that the act charged was prior to the accusation.
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