Wood v. Curran

Paterson, J. This is an action to quiet title to a lot of land in the city of San Francisco. John Agnew took possession of the property in 1868, and held the same until April 25, 1871, when he conveyed it to John Hogan, who entered into possession of the land and held it until his death, which occurred August 6, 1874. Hogan left surviving him the widow, Ellen, and four minor children. Letters of administration were issued to Ellen August 26, 1874. On October 3,1884, after due proceedings had, the lot was sold under an order of the probate court to the respondent, who received a deed from the administratrix on October 20th. On the same day the respondent received from Ellen Hogan a quit-claim deed of the property.

The appellant claims under a judgment in Harney v. Corcoran, foreclosing the lien of a street assessment on the property in controversy. This judgment was entered on June 3, 1879, and the sheriff’s deed to appellant is dated December 4, 1883. The proceedings leading up to the street assessment were initiated by resolution of intention, filed March 27, 1876. It is admitted that the respondent had actual notice of the sheriff’s deed to appellant.

Ellen was a party to "the action of Harney v. Corcoran, individually, but not as administratrix, and none of the minor heirs were represented.

We think, upon the facts stated, the court below properly held the title to be in defendant. Under the act of 1872, upon which the assessment lien was based, the land is not sued or summoned as a party; it is simply described, the owner being the defendant. The action therefore to foreclose was not a proceeding strictly in rem. The decree was in personam, the measure of satisfaction, however, being the interest which the defendant had in the land. Of course, the plaintiff did not acquire by his purchase under the decree in that action the interest of the minor children; that interest passed to the defendant herein by the probate sale subsequently made, neither the heirs nor the personal representative of Hogan having been a party to the action.

The judgment in Harney v. Corcoran against Ellen Hogan did not bind Ellen as administratrix of the estate of John Hogan, deceased. It is settled here that a judgment for or

[141]against a party in one right does not affect him when acting in another right. (Stockton etc. Ass’n v. Chalmers, 75 Cal. 332; 7 Am. St. Rep. 173; Archbishop v. Shipman, 69 Cal. 586.) The respondent took all the right, title, and interest which Ellen acquired by succession, but he took it subject to the provisions of the Probate Act for the support of the family of the deceased, and for the payment of the expenses for administration and the debts outstanding against the deceased. Where the widow after the death of her husband executed and delivered a quit-claim deed, it was held that this fact constituted no ground for the refusal of the probate court to set apart to her as a homestead a portion of the land conveyed by the deed; that if an heir conveys his interest in the estate of an ancestor, it will carry only such interest as will remain to him after satisfying the objects of administration. The court there said: “Upon the death of an intestate, his property goes by succession to his heirs, subject to administration. The objects of administration are: 1. To support the family for a period; 2. To set apart a homestead to the family; 3. To pay the expense of administration ; 4. To pay the debts of the deceased; 5. To distribute the balance of the estate to those who take it by law.” (Estate of Moore, 57 Cal. 437.) So, where the heirs of the deceased executed a mortgage upon the property inherited from him, it was held that the purchaser at the foreclosure sale acquired no greater or higher right in the mortgaged premises than the mortgagors held, and that the property in his hands was subject to the orders and proceedings of the probate court as fully in all respects as if the mortgage had not been foreclosed. (Cook v. De La Guerra, 24 Cal. 241.)