Conlin v. Board of Supervisors

California Supreme Court Jul 21, 1893 No. No. 15093Published

Before: Harrison

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Holding. The court held that a legislative act directing a municipality to pay a contractor for work where no legal liability exists constitutes an unconstitutional gift of public funds under Article IV, Section 31 of the California Constitution.

Issues

Whether a legislative act directing a municipality to pay a claim for which there is no legal obligation violates the constitutional prohibition against gifts of public money.
Whether a court may consider facts outside the face of a statute and matters of judicial notice when determining its constitutionality.

Disposition. reversed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“An appropriation of money by the legislature for the relief of one who has no legal claim therefor must be regarded as a gift within the meaning of that term, as used in this section”

“We hold, therefore, that the act in question violates the provisions of the foregoing section of the constitution, and is therefore invalid”

Synopsis

Constitutional Law—Validity of Act fob Relief of Stbeet Contbaotob— Mandamus — Pleading-—Demubbeb to Answeb__The validity of a statute must be determined only by facts appearing upon the face of the statute, and those of which the court can take judicial notice, and a demurrer to an answer setting forth certain matters alleged to be the basis of the action of the legislature in passing the act should be sustained.

Id.—Gift from Municipal Treasury—Appropriation without Legal Claim— Unconstitutional Statute. — An appropriation of money from the treasury of a municipality, by an act for the relief of a street contractor, who theretofore had no legal claim against the municipality, is a gift within the prohibition of section 31 of article IV. of the state constitution, and the act making such appropriation is unconstitutional and void, where it shows by its own terms that there was no prior legal obligation resting upon the municipality.

Id.—Judicial Notice of Statutes Regulating Street Improvement in San Francisco—Liability of City and County.—The supreme court takes judicial notice of statutes regulating street improvements in the city and county of San Francisco, and that in no case would the city and county be liable for any portion of the expense of such improvements or for any delinquency of persons or property assessed.

Id.—Moral Claim for Benefit Received.—The mere fact that the city and county enjoyed the actual advantage and benefit of the work done by the street contractor, does not create any moral obligation to pay for the cost, and cannot support a statute appropriating money out of the municipal treasury for his relief.

Harrison, J. The legislature of this state at its session in 1891 passed the following act (Stats. 1891, p. 513): —

“The board of supervisors of the city and county of San Francisco are hereby authorized and directed to order paid to John J. Conlin, or his assigns or legal representatives, the sum of $54,015.37, said amount being the principal, together with all [20]the interest thereon, that remains due and unpaid to the said John J. Conlin, on contracts entered into with the said John J. Conliu by the superintendent of streets of the said city and county, for work done upon the public streets of said city and county, and for material furnished for the improvement of the said public streets; for which work done and material furnished he has not been able to obtain compensation, according to the mode and procedure in such cases made and provided by statute, by reason of errors, omissions and irregularities of the municipal officers of the said city and county, in their official proceedings concerning such work and material furnished.”

Thereafter the plaintiff presented his demand for the said amount to the board of supervisors, and on the 7th of December, 1891, the board refused to allow or order the same paid, whereupon the plaintiff brought this proceeding in the superior court to obtain a mandate directing the defendants to allow the claim. The defendants filed an answer to the said complaint, in which they set forth certain matters alleged to be the basis of the action of the legislature in passing the act, and pleaded that by virtue thereof the act was in contravention of certain provisions of the constitution. The plaintiff demurred to this answer, but the court overruled his demurrer, and made findings of fact upon the issues presented by the answer, but in its conclusions of law held that the validity of the act must be determined from its face, and could not be made to depend upon matters of fact not appearing thereon.

In Stevenson v. Colgan, 91 Cal. 652; 25 Am. St. Rep. 230, we said that “in passing upon the constitutionality of a statute, the court must confine itself to a consideration of those matters which appear upon the face of the law, and those facts of which it can take judicial notice”; and the same principle was repeated in Bourn v. Hart, 93 Cal. 321; 27 Am. St. Rep. 203. The court in the present instance followed this rule in its conclusions of law, but its previous action in hearing evidence and making findings of fact, wherein it attempted to ascertain the “errors, omissions, and irregularities of municipal officers,” which in its findings it assumed to be “referred to in the act of the legislature of 1891,” was inconsistent therewith. It should have sustained the demurrer to the answer, and deter

Conlin v. Board of Supervisors

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