County of San Diego v. Seifert
Synopsis
License Tax—Ordinance of Supervisors—Action by County—Pleading— Uncertainty— Defects Cured by Answer and Judgment. — In an action by a county to recover a license tax imposed by an ordinance of the supervisors, where the complaint alleged that the defendant was required to procure a license tax under and by virtue of an ordinance of the board of supervisors of said county duly passed and approved at a regular meeting, and thereafter duly published as required by law, and alleged a failure, refusal, and neglect of defendant to pay such license tax, in violation of the ordinance, but did not allege specifically that defendant failed to take out a license, and the defendant, without demurring to the complaint for uncertainty, filed an answer taking issue upon the passage or approval of the ordinance, and upon the failure of the defendant to take out a license, it is too late after such answer, and after decision and judgment, to object that the complaint was uncertain, and did not show the existence of the ordinance, or a violation of the ordinance upon which the action was founded.
Id. — General Findings —• Support of Judgment. — A general finding that all the allegations of the complaint are true, and the denials and allegations of the answer are untrue, is sufficient to support a judgment in favor of a county for the collection of a license tax sued upon.
Id. — Evidence —Ordinance Fixing Regular Meetings of Supervisors —Burden of Proof. —Where the question at issue is, whether an ordinance of the supervisors imposing a license tax was passed at a regular meeting, and the plaintiff introduced in evidence a prior ordinance of the supervisors, declaring that the regular meetings should be held on the first Monday of every month, the validity of which ordinance was not put in issue by the pleadings, the plaintiff is not required to show that the meeting at which such ordinance was passed was itself a regular meeting.
Id. — Presumption from Record of Ordinance. —The presumption arising from the existence of an ordinance upon the record of ordinances is sufficient to entitle it to be received in evidence without further proof, in the absence of evidence showing its invalidity.
Id. — Continuity of Regular Meeting of Supervisors — Attestation of Minutes Showing Adjournment — Unsigned Record. — Section 19 of the County Government Act, providing that the records and minutes of the board of supervisors must be signed by the chairman and clerk, merely has the effect to make their signatures evidence indentifying the minutes; and their failure to sign the minutes does not render the record inadmissible as proof of the action of the board, in meeting and adjourning, for the purpose of showing the continuity of the session of the board at a regular meeting; but if the handwriting of the entries, their contemporaneous character, and the official custody from which the record is produced are proved, the minutes are competent to show the action of the board.
The Court. This action is to recover from the defendant, Seifert, the sum of $120, the amount of a li[596]cense tax imposed upon his business as a saloon-keeper for a period of twelve months, under an ordinance of the board of supervisors.
The cause was tried by the court, and findings and judgment passed in favor of plaintiff, and the defendant appeals from the judgment, and an order denying his motion for a new trial.
Appellant contends that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, in that,— 1. Facts are not alleged showing the existence of the ordinance; and 2. That the complaint fails to show a violation of the ordinance upon which the action is founded. Upon this ground, defendant objected in proper time to the introduction of any evidence.
Neither of these points is well taken. The complaint alleges “ that under and by virtue of the provisions of an ordinance of the board of supervisors of said county duly passed and approved at a regular meeting of the board held on the twenty-second day of January, A. D. 1890, and thereafter- duly published as required by law, said ordinance being known as ordinance No. "48 of the ordinances of the county of San Diego, and entitled, etc., the defendant was required to procure a license from the tax collector, .... and to pay for such license the sum of ten dollars per month.” This allegation might not have stood as against a demurrer for uncertainty, but no demurrer was filed. Furthermore, the defendant in his answer alleged that he had no information or belief as to the truth of the allegation above quoted, and therefore denied that the hoard of supervisors had duly or at all passed or approved ordinance No. 48, as in said allegation referred to.
The complaint alleged that the defendant “ failed, refused, and neglected, and still does fail, refuse, and neglect, to pay such license tax, contrary to and in violation of the provisions of said ordinance.” There is no allegation in the complaint that he failed to take out a license, but in his answer the defendant, “ further answering, denies that he, during the times mentioned [597]in said complaint, or at any other time or times, have or had neglected, failed, or refused, or still neglect, fail, or refuse, to take out any license, as required by said ordinance.” It is too late now, after answering to the merits, decision, and judgment, to raise the objections referred to. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 475; Harkness v. McClain, 29 Pac. Rep. 964.)
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